



# SWAT: THE MAIN CAUSES OF THE BREAKDOWN OF GOVERNANCE AND RISE OF MILITANCY by Khalid Aziz





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
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# Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA & PATA MAP



# Abbreviations

ANP	Awami National Party
CBO	Community Based Organization
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Area
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
JI	Jamiat-e-Islami
JM	Jaish Muhammad (A Jihadi organization)
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LeT	Lashikra-e-Taiba (A Jihadi organization)
MMA	Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFC	National Finance Commission
NHP	Net Hydel Profit
NUPI	The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
PATA	Provincially Administered Tribal Area
PCNA	Post Crisis Need Assessment
PPP	Pakistan Peoples Party
RIPORT	Regional Institute of Policy Research and Training, Peshawar
TNSM	Tehrik-e Nifas-e-Shariah Muhammadi
TTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
VDO	Village Development Based Organization



# Preface

This report on, “SWAT: The Main Causes of the Breakdown of Governance and Rise of Militancy” has been an enriching experience for me and the survey team that worked on this joint project with NUPI, Oslo. The project was initiated in February and concluded at the end of June 2010. The exercise has been personally rewarding as it clarified certain aspects of the crisis in Swat that were ambiguous before.

I hope that the report will go some way in convincing policy makers to initiate far reaching reforms that will lead to peace and mending the lives of people who have seen so much pain and sorrow.

I take this opportunity of thanking the very generous and working group of researchers at NUPI who patiently watched the progress of this joint project. I want to especially thank Helge Luras and Paul Petzschmann for their assistance and encouragement in this project.

The views expressed in this report are mine and are not attributable to any other person or organization.

Khalid Aziz



Chairman,  
RIPORT,  
Peshawar.



# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### A. Introduction

RIPORT (Regional Institute of Policy Research and Training, Peshawar) and NUPI (The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo) agreed in Feb 2010 to conduct a statistical inquiry based on perceptions of households in Swat regarding what they considered to be the main causes of breakdown of governance and the rise of militancy that took total control of Swat from July 2007 until Sept 2009, when the Pakistan military re-established the writ of the state.

From Feb 2009 to Sept 2009 more than 2.5 million residents of Swat had to leave their homes and became internally displaced persons in the districts of Peshawar, Mardan, Swabi, Charsadda and Nowshera. It was one of the largest exoduses of people recorded in humanitarian relief effort since the Second World War.

There are many reasons for the crisis in Swat. However in my view and based on the findings of this research the main cause of the problem of Swat lies in its incomplete merger and integration into Pakistan after the state was merged in 1969. Although the order for the merger was issued yet there was no plan how it was to be transformed from a princely state where all the power was vested in a ruler to a district working under normal laws. The elite of Swat, local industrialists and the Pakistani bureaucracy wanted to maintain the status quo and thus to enjoy their privileges and powers. Consequently, Swat continued to be administered through *Riwaj* (customary law as laid down by the ex-ruler of Swat). In doing so, Swat and its inhabitants were marginalized. Large regulatory gaps appeared that were very cleverly exploited. However the paradigm shift occurred when the Swat problematic got immersed into the rhetoric of the War on Terror and the narrative of Jihad. This clash has not ended.

Secondly, other vested interests who wished to retain the status quo for extending their privileges obtained during the ex-State days did not wish the normal laws of the land to prevail as that would have brought in tax and customs laws injurious to those privileges.

These vested interests included the owners of the cosmetic, silk yarn and pharmaceutical industry. As this saga of failed integration played out, it combined with a policy of appeasement mixed with political expediency that was adopted by different political leaders of the province and the federation. It led to the creation of the acute crisis of Swat in April 2009 when the military had to step in. This will be elaborated in more detail in Chapter 8, C.

## **B. Swat crisis in 2009**

An examination of the events that occurred in Swat district from mid 2004 to April 2009 leaves no doubt in one's mind, that Mulla Fazalullah and Sufi Mohammad were *terrorists* who are responsible for murder and sedition against the state. One of their most barbarous act took place in December 2008 when the terrorists dumped 27 bodies of executed persons in the Green Chowk, Mingora – the capital town of the district. On January 6, 2009 another five bodies of executed security officials were dumped in the same place.<sup>1</sup> In retrospect it is horrifying to recollect that this monster was provided space by the previous government.

There cannot be any ambivalence on this score that the Swat disturbance was terrorism plain and simple. It is another matter if the State was so compromised as not to be able to implement its writ. It also did not have the capacity to investigate crimes that were committed by terrorists against the unarmed and innocent people of Swat and the many government functionaries who lost their lives at their hands! This malaise has continued even today and about 3000 militants are detained without trial.

Though peace has been brought by the military, however it does not appear that the Taliban are routed yet. Some recent reports speak of their attacks and violence in the bordering Afghan province of Nuristan.<sup>2</sup> It points to a distinct possibility that Pakistan and the people of Swat may see the Taliban make a comeback – if they do, it will point to a failure of the security managers. Such an eventuality will create a lamentable situation for Pakistan.<sup>3</sup>

## **C. Purpose of research**

At the analytical level the purpose of this research is to examine from the perspective of Swat households the impact of the economic, development, governance, regulatory, security and reform policies followed by governments in Swat since its merger with Pakistan in 1969.

At the research level nine hypotheses are tested. The report also examines a general hypothesis that states that the majority of those who challenge the state mostly contain the marginalized communities. They are the ones who have no jobs, their livelihood is marginal and thus become aggrieved enough to settle the score with the State, (Kilcullen: 35-38)<sup>4</sup>. They can be labeled as the accidental guerillas. The question here is whether the uprising in Swat can be placed in the category of a war fought by those whom the state had by passed and failed to integrate in its processes and ignored their growth and development?

One of the goals of this project is that its findings are translated into policy recommendations for the government so that proposed changes strengthen the state and protect the people. While examining various aspects of policies including the PCNA we note the impact of such policies on the emergence of militancy and terrorism in Swat. The priority of this study is to identify from the people's perspective those factors that led to the breakdown of governance and a weakening of the State since 2004.

Clearly the US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 by itself did not create the crisis of state in Swat. However it acted as a catalyst to attract many of those who had different religious, social or personal grievances that became a Jihadist narrative in Swat. Secondly the leaders of the insurgency had very cleverly connected their movement within religious dogma to condemn the US role in Afghanistan; it provided these challengers a powerful justification for their activities.

## D. Area of investigation

RIPORT and NUPI signed a MoU in Feb 2010 to examine the *“Main Causes for the Breakdown of Governance and the Rise of Militancy in Swat,”* that was to be through a survey based on perceptions of the households in Swat. The survey, FGDs as well as interviews with key informants were finalized in April.

In order to study the Swat society in all its complexity we developed nine hypotheses that arose from our first set of interviews with leading key informants Swat. The hypotheses were then broken down into questionnaires and were also used as discussion points during FGDs and key informants. These hypotheses are:

- When the government fails to provide *public service* to communities it weakens the bond between the state and the individual and creates grievances thus weakening the state.

- Many of those who are *marginalized* because of lack of access to law, education, health employment or due to income deficit are the future recruits to the ranks of the militants
- The PATA Regulation 1969 *marginalized* Swat and that created many issues leading to weak governance and that finally culminated in militancy and terrorism.
- That the rank and file of those who challenged the state mainly included persons from marginalized communities in terms of access to employment, livelihood and identity and were thus upset with the State.
- Many unemployed youth joined the insurgents because of poverty others became militants because of deprivation of assets — particularly land.
- The rise of militancy in Swat is the creation of years of *mis-governance*, an inability to dispense *quick justice*, lack of reform to *mainstream* Swat, and marginalization of inhabitants.
- It is surmised that the implementation of the Local Bodies Reform 2001 weakened the administrative structure in Swat by removal of district administration that provided the militants space to organize and strengthen themselves. This occurred at a time when the government of KP was headed by a religious alliance whose members were supportive of the militants.
- Many believe that there is a close relationship between religious based education and militancy.
- Poor regulation of laws relating to illegal *broadcast* through FM transmitters encouraged the spread of militancy and strengthened the TNSM and TTP in Swat. The female were also more prone to be affected to by FM broadcasts.
- The government failed to check the militancy from 2002-2007 by not protecting people and their property. This neglect led to the rise of militancy in Swat.

Before starting the discussion on the above issues it is necessary to define the meaning of important terms that will be constantly used in this analysis:

- A *militant* is defined as someone who takes an aggressive and combative position on an issue and wants to resolve it by fighting.



- A *terrorist* is defined as someone who uses coercion without lawful authority over helpless civilians to support his case. According to this definition such a person violates the law and is a common criminal.
- An *extremist* is defined as someone who holds very conservative and extreme religious views.
- A *radical* is defined as someone who holds politically extreme views and may wish to dismantle the existing socio-political system.

# CHAPTER 2

## METHODOLOGY

### A. Introduction

Before the start of research in Feb 2010 an inception report was prepared and shared with NUPI. The major features contained in the inception report are explained.

This is the first joint research of its type in the region that studies a zone of conflict (Swat) within the local setting and looks at the people of Swat in their entirety, as they live and interact at different levels. It examines the impact of government policies and the physical, economic, human, informational, reform and ideological setting of the region and its people, (Kilcullen:304-5).<sup>5</sup> In this study Swat is combed for perceptions of the people both the ordinary and the intellectuals. The survey was an attempt to study the phenomenon of conflict in Swat holistically and not in isolation.

### B. Survey approach

The survey used a multi dimensional approach covering the qualitative and the quantitative aspects such as:

- Interviews of district official and key informants to obtain their views on different issues to add to the qualitative aspect.
- Holding of focus group discussion with community leaders representing CBO (Community Based Organization), VDO (Village Development Based Organization) and public representative from local government and serving and retired officials from the community.
- Conducting a household based random survey in the different union councils of Swat for finding perceptions of the communities about various issues. In this connection 384 households were surveyed giving a validity of 95% to the result (Annex-1 Fig-1).
- The survey also tested the validity of the hypotheses mentioned earlier on page numbers 7-8.

## C. Survey features

- The survey design followed the distribution of population in Swat that is 14% (Urban) and 86% (Rural). The sample was distributed in the same proportion. A total of 53 household were selected from urban Swat and 331 households from rural Swat.
- The households were selected by using systematic random sampling technique. The systematic selection of villages was based on the size of village in case of rural area and enumeration block in case of urban areas.
- 19 primary units were selected for the conduct of the household survey and the FGD. 3 of these units were in the urban areas and 16 were in the rural areas. 2 FGDs were planned for the urban areas and 7 FGDs for the rural areas.
- During the survey additional key informants were interviewed who at the end of the survey numbered 23. Additional FGDs were also undertaken. Two of these were for women so that gender views were prominently reflected.
- Since the survey touched matters that were fraught with risk connected with the prevalence of violence and perceived criminality in many cases, therefore the respondent's resistance to answering questions had to be overcome. There were two ways by which this reservation was addressed. RIPOORT already has a team of workers working on a Trauma Management project in 16 Union Councils of the district. They have over a period of time developed creditability with the community about the non-sharing of identities with anyone – a practice borrowed from the trauma management protocol. Even while archiving the survey result in the data base, proxy numbers were used to protect the respondent's identity. This is considered a best practice in research in conflict prone regions.
- After the survey its results was analyzed using SPSS and Excel, for calculating results and have been published in a statistical compendium under the title, "*A Survey of Perceptions about the Drivers of Conflict in Swat.*"

## D. Categories

- In this analysis we examine the implications of important survey results from the key areas identified in the analysis and that cover the following 8 categories:
  - Communication
  - Development
  - Foreign Intervention
  - Governance

- Poverty
  - Religion
  - Security
  - Social Customs
- The above classification is not water tight and there is a connection between some of them that become apparent during analysis of many of the key results discussed in this report. For instance the sections on development and poverty have common themes. There is a similar connection between development, poverty, governance, communication and security.

## F. Caveats

- In our eagerness for simplification, we tend to ignore the real world operating dynamics that are caused by an event in one part of the continuum and cause lead on effects in other parts. Thus we must realize that action in any part of a social system may have repercussions in another
- Thus one must be careful while undertaking reform and we must get as much clarity of the possible *unintended consequences* of actions before proceeding. As the result from the survey shows, the unintended consequence of the *Local Government Reforms of 2001* was the elimination of an important security layer of district and sub-divisional magistracy; the pivot around which law and order (a sub-continental word denoting security) revolved. The creation of this security gap encouraged the unhindered emergence of militancy in Swat and elsewhere in the KP province. This is discussed fully in a separate section.
- However, this does not mean that there should be no reforms. For instance there is a big policy gap that requires to be filled in the field of governance and security areas before the military can be expected to leave. This has now become quite frustrating. The military says that creating that policy is the job of the political executive. Whatever the arguments in this matter, one fact remains that the high level civil-military coordination required for a successful counter insurgency effort is missing.

- The result of the statistical study indicates that had governance been faithfully carried out by those who are responsible for it and then maybe the Swat crisis would never have happened. Failure by decision makers to fulfill their responsibilities and shun expediencies and short term gains would have reduced the chances of an upheaval in Swat. At the cost of being termed simplistic, the story of Swat indicates that the failure to manage the responsibility enjoined by law and the questionable role of leaders heading the system were the main factors responsible for the crisis.

# CHAPTER 3

## DEMOGRAPHY AND BRIEF HISTORY

### A. Demography

The Swat region has remained populated region with an archaeological history that goes as far back as two thousand years. Its name in that period was Udyana. Its location made it an important stopping point for many invaders including Alexander the Great and Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni. By the second century BC, Swat had become a shiny jewel of the Gandhara civilization that was a mixture of Buddhist and Greek culture. Swat was a center of Hinayana Buddhism and of the Mahayana school that developed from it. The Chinese pilgrim Fa-Hsien, visited the valley around 403 AD, at that time there were more than 500 monasteries in the region with close links to Tibet.

From the 8th century AD, the Muslims from Arabia began appearing as invaders in the Persian-Afghan region and the area was converted to Islam. In 1001 AD, Mahmud of Ghazni began his invasions of India. He conquered Swat amongst other areas and it came under the rule of the Muslims. The invasions from the North also brought new people and by the 14th century the Yusufzais began infiltrating into the Swat valley.

By the 15th century Yusufzai had dispensed with the locals and replaced them by a Yusufzai confederacy. The aboriginal inhabitants of the land scuttled away into the mountains around Swat and Hazara where they began to be called Swatis or Kohistanis (The mountain people). The people of Swat are thus mainly Pakhtuns, Kohistanis and Gujars. Some have very distinct features including blonde hair and blue eyes possibly of Dardic extraction while many others claim to be descendants of the army of Alexander the Great.

### B. Early administration

In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century Swat was ruled sporadically by religious leaders who were known as Akhund or the pious and learned. The Islamic State of Swat was first established in 1849



with the Jihadist Sayyid Akbar Shah as the ruler under Shariah. However there was conflict in the region with Dir and the area remained disturbed from 1863 to 1915. Sayyid Abdul-Jabbar Khan was made ruler by a local jirga and had trouble exercising power. In 1917 another Jirga appointed Miangul Abdul Wadud as the new ruler. The British recognized the state in 1926. After Independence in 1947, the ruler signed the Instrument of Accession with Pakistan. According to it Swat became a part of Pakistan. However, the first error of statecraft occurred at this moment when the normal administration of Pakistan was not imposed and the state remained under the rule.

During the survey it was found that the people were easily influenced by religious personalities. Some of the survey result clearly showed that the people were influenced by religion or religious personalities. 83% of the respondents supported this attribute of Swatis as a fact (Annex-1, Fig 47). To a related question, 78% of the respondents said that religious sentiments can be easily exploited in Swat (Annex-1, Fig 48). Historically the Swat religious leaders were under the influence of Jihadist until Abdul Wadud took over the rule in 1917.

### C. Wali's rule in Swat

The Ruler of Swat, called the Wali ruled the people as an autocrat with full power and with Pakistani consent after 1947 till 1969. He co-opted the big landlords with him by giving them a share of the fines that he imposed and the Khans collected. At the same time the Wali won over the religious elements that included the Mullah of mosques and the learned religious jurists by appointing them as Qazis of courts and also paying them salaries.<sup>6</sup>

However the Wali kept the Qazis under strict supervision and did not allow them to exercise any independent authority. Their decisions had to be ratified by state officials. In 1954, the Wali signed a Supplementary Instrument of Accession through which the supremacy of the Pakistani law was accepted by the Wali. He was required to appoint an advisory council composed of elected and nominated members and a Chief Minister. However no Chief Minister was appointed as was the case with other princely states. The ruler was allowed to rule autocratically.<sup>7</sup> Pakistani laws and courts were barred from exercising any jurisdiction. In brief Pakistan thus became a partner with the Wali and the landed aristocracy in perpetuating their hold in Swat until its confused integration into Pakistan in 1969.

The people of Swat today are still nostalgic about the days of peace during the Wali's time. However, the underlying injustices suffered by the less privileged were suppressed. 34% of the respondents felt that the failure to assimilate Swat as a regular district gave space to the militants to emerge while 22% disagreed and 44% said that they did not know (Annex-1, Fig 21)

The answer for the failure to integrate the princely states lies in the crisis of the Pakistani state after its creation in 1947. Pakistan not only had to provide relief to the more than 7 million refugees who had migrated from India to Pakistan at Partition but it also needed to place a structure of government for the new state into place. Simultaneously, it had to face dual security and financial challenges generated by acrimony with India and a war in Kashmir as well as India's refusal to share financial assets as had been agreed by the two states. Britain as the implementing state ignored its responsibilities in this matter.

It may be said that the situation was bad for Pakistan at the time of Independence hence the state was not merged. However, why was the issue of Swat and other princely States of Malakand left unresolved for twenty two years since 1969 after merger? This is a valid question and the answer lies in the dynamics of multiple causes. However the most important one to my mind is the poor failure to plan purposefully the integration of Swat & FATA into a cohesive state.

The principle reason for Pakistan's descent into weakened institutional incoherence was a result of strife between the institutions of civil authority and the military. No country can build its institutions, if powerful bodies within the state are bent on usurping power rather than concentrating on state building and accepting the rule of law. The constant cycle of disruption of the state by Martial Laws and ascendancy of opportunism as the preferred mode of conducting state craft caused ruinous policies.<sup>8</sup> The political development of Swat was no exception.

## **D. Support to militants**

It is apparent that the people of Swat have a historical tradition and obedience to religious authority based on their past when they lent support to Jihadist movements that occurred at the start of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The people were also used to the leadership role played by Mullahs in selecting the kings of Swat in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Thus, when Sufi Mohammad

in 1994 began his TNSM movement for the introduction of Shariah they gave him support it was not novel.

They followed him into Afghanistan in Nov 2001 when he asked them to fight a Jihad against the US and NATO forces. Again when Maulvi Fazalullah began his career of militant extremism in 2004, based on opportunities provided by an ambivalent MMA government, many of whom believed in Jihad, the people of Swat rewound their historical background of the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century and started to support the trumpeters of Jihad believing that another era of religious leadership was around the corner and that they should lend support. This allowed the terrorists to quickly capture the local population and exploit them. The capture of the people of Swat was also made possible by a provincial government that was supportive of the militant extremists. In the house hold survey three related questions were asked of responding households:

- 75% of the respondents confirmed that the MMA provincial government of KP was sympathetic towards the militants (Annex-1, Fig 22)
- 82% of the respondents were of the opinion that the provincial government of KP did not fight militancy effectively in Swat (Annex-1, Fig 23)
- To another question about the commitment of the MMA government in fighting against the militancy 67% of the households thought that it did not (Annex-1, Fig 24)

It is obvious that the provincial government was not protecting the state

# CHAPTER 4

## COMMUNICATION

### A. Introduction

One of the major finding to emerge from the survey of households, the connected FGDs, and interviews with key informant was the effective role played by the illegal FM radio station that the terrorists used with effective results. It was not only a technology for radicalizing the population also a tool of public outreach for carrying out the program of the terrorist leadership as well as a vehicle for collection of donations voluntarily or through extortion. The following are the important findings:

- In the survey 78% of respondents agreed that “Radio Mullah” helped the insurgency to establish itself in Swat (Annex-1, Fig 7).
- 56% of the sample said that the broadcast over the FM built demand for the introduction of Shariah in Swat (Annex-1, Fig 9).
- 68% of the respondents agreed very strongly that the sermons broadcast from the FM gathered support for the militants (Annex-1, Fig 11).
- In the face to face type of communication delivered through sermons at Friday prayers, 75% of the respondents said that the sermons mobilized support for the militants (Annex-1, Fig 10)
- On a connected matter it was found that there were many Mullahs of mosques in Swat who were Afghans and used the pulpit to gain support for the cause of the militants. These Afghan Mullahs are the ones who grew up in the Afghan Refugee camps and had come to the region during the Mujahideen War against the Soviet Union. 67% of the respondents agreed that such Mullahs encouraged the people to support the terrorists (Annex-1, Fig 8).

### B. Impact of the FM on female

One of the most enigmatic aspects of the FM was its effect on women. During the FGDs with females it was disclosed that the FM empowered them since they could speak to Fazalullah over the telephone at the FM station and who would listen to them and discuss

their problems. It gave them a sense of power since they could influence policy of the terrorists it also provided them an opportunity to discuss matters with the leaders. The militants very cleverly obtained the loyalties of the female population by serving them messages through motivated translations and interpretations from the Holy Quran.

The result was that women, who were ultimately victimized in this process, unwittingly became complicit in a cycle of crime when they began to follow the advice of Mullah Fazalullah by providing him support. The explanation for this paradox lies in the realm of criminology and abnormal psychology. Since the woman in Swat have poor religious education they were not able to distinguish between right and wrong and believed whatever was broadcast on the radio and considered as religious sermon from a purported Holy person.<sup>9</sup>

They were given to understand that the Taliban would reestablish the Golden Age of Islam. They were encouraged to donate money and were also persuaded to pressurize their husbands and sons to join the terrorists in Jihad against Pakistan since the government supported the US. Furthermore, the Taliban encouraged women to make telephone calls to the radio station. Some women complained on telephone that the Taliban were guilty of infringing the Islamic code when they spoke to unknown women; Fazalullah could not rebut this challenge. It led some women to stop listening to the broadcasts.

In a sense a woman with a radio became captive to the constant haranguing delivered over Mullah Radio. Since she was discouraged from learning the house she was forced to listen to the FM for entertainment. During a focus group discussion in Swat, some women respondents confessed to have become supporters of the Taliban when Mullah Fazalullah declared that it was forbidden for married women who lived in joint households to speak to their brother-in-laws! It provided many women an "Islamic" justification- a la Fazalullah style to separate from their - in some cases - oppressive in-laws. It made the Taliban popular in many households and they were seen as a liberating influence by women!

Over a period of time, as the Taliban of Swat became more entrenched and powerful they began prompting women via their radio to make donations to their cause. Many respondents who were interviewed reported that they gave their jewelry, money and in one case, her car to the Taliban. Some of the pronouncement over the FM radio asked women to convince

their husbands to join their ranks; other broadcasts urged women to hit the military and police patrols with stones when they came to their vicinity

An examination of the process highlighted above clearly showed the power of the FM radio when as a platform for an outreach program of recreating identities as well as an instrument of mind-control. While the initial entry of the Taliban into the women's mind was made via religious imagery, the subsequent takeover of their judgment and the exclusion of ideas expressed through competing TV or DVD blocked when the Taliban banned competing media the complete take-over of their mind.

The nearest comparable phenomenon to this occurrence that finds parallels is with the brain washing techniques used by the North Koreans against prisoners of war. Those who studied the phenomenon in the late 1950's found that the takeover of mind followed a ten step process that began with an assault on the identity of a person and the creation of guilt and ended with the birth of a new personality. In the case of the women of Swat that initial attack is on her normal identity as a person living her life within the parameters of a relatively liberal Pakhtun cultural tradition. The attack by Taliban on the women is gender specific and meant to create guilt in her mind. Gradually it stripped her of decency and she began to think of herself as an evil entity – when this takes place her identity breaks down completely and she is enclosed within a cocoon of guilt – at this stage it allows the terrorists to super impose another identity on her that is favorable to militants.

On the other hand her existence as an individual is destroyed when she is prohibited to come out of the house except with a male member of the family; her places of education in school are burnt and she is not even permitted medical treatment in hospital except under specific conditions. Such prohibitions lead the women to hate herself. She feels belittled.

Here her identity is replaced by a new one which is anchored in pseudo - religion of the Taliban. Already suffering the burden of guilt the women develops a strong guilt complex. She tries to atone for it by making extravagant donations to the Taliban and by convincing her husband to support the terrorists. In this way she hopes to regain favor with them. When she reaches this stage she has supplanted her previous identity by a new one! However while the female undergoes this trauma of identity change, She unwittingly begins a journey towards criminality when her donations to an outlawed outfit technically makes her an accessory to a crime against the State!



On another level, when she convinces her husband to help the militants, she descends further into the spiral of crime and builds a path for her own destruction! During the last two months of 2008 the Taliban executed more than 15 women after accusing them of immoral and un-Islamic practices.<sup>10</sup>

The results from the Swat survey regarding the tendency of women to be more conservative than men confirms the conclusions reached in another research that finds that since women have an inferior social status than men in Pakhtun society therefore they do not get enough opportunities of interacting with society and the agents of change. The result is Pakistani women generally tend to be more conservative as compared with men. Secondly, their conservatism becomes a source for amplifying this conservatism in men who remain in contact with them.<sup>11</sup>

In terms of a priority plan of investment for Swat that plans to nurse it back to health, investment in Social Protection and Strategic Communication must be the two top most options. In the current crisis the value of FM broadcasting platforms is far greater than the construction of a school or a health unit – before the brick and masonry of normal development strategy sets in - the minds of the people need to be transformed first, the mindset must be shifted from bigoted obscurantism to values that lie in the concepts of peace, love and brotherhood. If good FM radio content can be delivered based on the above values, then the other development interventions in health and education, will be that much more welcome, effective and meaningful.

Many of the socio-political problems prevalent in stressed societies that include Swat have their origin in marginalization. It is defined as the social process of becoming or being made marginal to or confined to or reduced to a lower social standing more nearer to the edge of society. There are basically three types of marginalizations. First, there is cultural marginalization where a minority group shares some cultural aspects of the dominant group, but also shares other cultural facets with one or other minority group. If a person is removed from that group owing to any factor the marginalized person is estranged from the minority cultural component of that society. Second, social marginalization also refers to a situation where a group is not allowed to participate fully in the institutions of society through prejudice, discrimination or some other form of exclusion. In such cases marginality is also experienced in the occupational structures. It is defined as economic marginalization. Third,

we have political marginalization where prejudice and discrimination are legalized or a regulatory framework created that disallows full participation of people or a region from participation with the rest of the nation. The thesis presented here and based on the knowledge obtained from this survey in Swat is that marginalization is the antithesis of a well integrated society and the greater the incidence of marginality in its various manifestations the greater the chance of the birth of militancy.

Let us examine the consequences of marginalization If someone is marginalized it means that he goes out of the circle of his regular community. He also is stripped of his identity. Anyone who goes out of his regular community and becomes a part of the marginalized community can surely be seconded into hatred against the system that caused a person's exit. If economic or financial marginalization occurs then the chances of that person entering relationships based on crime or on hatred of the state increase considerably.

Most of the analysis that has emerged describing the causes that lead to the conundrum of extremist militancy are categorized within one or another of an over arching organizing scheme. Almost all recognize that the causes are multiple. Yet amongst the many factors that are at the core of extremist violence the frequent occurrence of marginalization and a feeling of being separated from the community is more evidently present.

# CHAPTER 5

## THE POVERTY TRAP

### A. Poverty as a cause of militancy in Swat

The current survey was undertaken to find out the perceptions of the households in Swat about the drivers of conflict in the district. One of the questions that constantly turned up for debate during discussions related to identifying the causes of conflict was whether poverty alone can create violence or is it rather the fuel that continues to stoke the insurgency and violence once it has started? Poverty can result from many causes. However poverty in Swat can be attributed principally to land and monetary resources. A large percentage of expert opinion believes that poverty itself cannot be the single cause for creating violence in any region; however it becomes an aggravating condition that may lead to the continuation of violence once it begins.<sup>12</sup> Let us begin our discussion of this issue by first comparing the relative position of Swat in terms of development indicators with other districts in KP. This will allow an assessment of poverty and inequality in Swat.

### B. Development indicators of Swat

An important survey done in the KP in 2001 was the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey that compared the relative position of the 24 districts in terms of six base indicators:<sup>13</sup>

- Infant mortality
- Malnourishment
- Primary school enrollment
- Adult literacy (15 year plus)
- Safe drinking water
- Adequate sanitation

The districts were divided into tercile of eight districts each. Swat emerged as under in the various categories shown above:

- In infant mortality Swat came in the 3<sup>rd</sup> tercile and was 21<sup>st</sup> out of 24 districts. The average infant mortality rate for the province was 79 deaths per 1000 live births, while in Swat the rate was 95.7 deaths per 1000 live births
- In the figures for malnourishment, Swat was again in the 3<sup>rd</sup> tercile and ranked 23<sup>rd</sup> out of 24<sup>th</sup> in terms of malnourishment.
- In terms of primary school enrollment Swat was in the 2<sup>nd</sup> tercile at number 11 and was within the provincial average for this indicator.
- In adult literacy Swat was in the 2<sup>nd</sup> tercile at number 9<sup>th</sup> and was ahead than the provincial average.
- For the indicator of safe drinking water Swat was in the 2<sup>nd</sup> tercile at number 9<sup>th</sup> and was better than the provincial average.
- For sanitation Swat was in the 1<sup>st</sup> tercile at number 7<sup>th</sup> and thus had a better average than the figure for province.

The figures indicate that Swat had weak health cover especially in facilities dealing with the mother and infant and this was reflected by its very high infant mortality rate. Similarly, the figures showed that Swat had higher levels of malnutrition. The combination of high infant mortality rate and widespread malnutrition points to another nightmare. That is a very pernicious form of *marginalization* and the likely prevalence of cognitive disorders in children.

In the absence of good medical care during pregnancy due to low income and the reliance on traditional birth attendants for child birth, the rate of complicated deliveries goes up in Swat. This trend is followed by a period of malnutrition for the newly born infant due to poverty of the parents. Under such circumstances the brain of the child is under developed and his or her cognitive capacity is reduced so that idea formation and the process of thinking become flawed. When such children are left to fend for themselves in woman led household then there is a disaster waiting to happen if a militant wants to misuse such children.

### C. Child bombers

After the military regained Swat from the terrorists in Aug-Sept of 2009 they came across another nightmare. They discovered groups of sub normal children who were first abused

physically and sexually and then handed over to trainers as child soldiers and suicide bombers. These children numbering about 126 were taken over by the military and placed under a re-education program called “Sabaoon” project managed by psychologists (“Hopeful Tomorrow”). The following is the profile of the children provided by the projects:

- Most of the children had been abducted or picked up in chance encounters. (About 65-70%)
- The chance encounters were outside the school and abductions were by militants.
- 65-70% of the children were performing significantly below the expectations of their peer group and chronological age in the school.
- A large number of children had dropped out of school for reasons of a) ability and or b) financial problems of the family.
- Most children (about 85%) were from families/sibling ship of 6-16 children and the child bombers were mostly from the middle children.
- They all had low self esteem, lacked impulse control and also suffered from aggressive tendencies that are the common characteristics of behavioral problem.
- Most of them also suffered from headaches, hallucinations and aggressiveness. In the EEG studies and on the basis of these symptoms the results were 100% positive indicating soft neuropathology that could result from dysrhythmia, partial seizures and epilepsy.

The reasons for these issues are complications at birth, poor nutrition and / or accidents in early childhood.<sup>14</sup>

These results from the “Sabaoon Project,” are in line with the Multi Indicator Cluster Survey discussed above and confirms that the prevalence of poverty not only created other problems of militancy related to inequalities that we will discuss shortly, but also caused secondary problems in children due to poverty that in turn created cognitive problems that were exploited by the terrorists who turned these unfortunate young boys into suicide bombers and child soldiers!

Did the government do anything about the poor indicators of Swat since 2001? The answer is not positive. This was confirmed by another survey that was undertaken to find the

relative progress of KP in meeting the targets of the Millennium Development Goals in 2005? It was found that four years after the first survey in 2001 –where Swat had an overall 15<sup>th</sup> position amongst the 24 districts comprising the KP province, it had slipped down by another two position to number 17!<sup>15</sup>


From these comparisons discussed above the natural tendency is to blame the provincial or the federal governments for the failure to address the problem. It is true that in the last resort it is the responsibility of the government to ensure that conditions are created in the socio-economic space where the households are able to meet their nutritional, health and educational requirements. This is an area of policy reform and macroeconomic management of the state. Unfortunately, the governments in the last decade have been so taken up by the security challenges that they have had little time to conceive anything else. In that sense the last ten years have been a decade of misery for the low income and deprived people of Swat and this deprivation has increased the number of *marginalized* people over a period of time. Is the state winning really when marginalization has increased?

## **D. Poor federal-provincial fiscal relationship**

Another problem that has weakened the ability of the provincial government of KP to provide larger resources for human investment in the field of health, education and social protection is embedded in the poor federal-provincial fiscal relationship. Pakistan is a federation that is heavily tilted in favor of the federal government and to the detriment of the provinces. The federation implements many policies that have generated acrimony with the federating units as well as reduce the flow of developmental funds.

It is in the provinces that the people live, yet it is the reduction in the transfer of resources to them that has caused under development. Because of the heavy outlay on defense and debt serving the provinces get only \$ 12.1 billion from a total budget of \$ 33 billion in 2010-2011. It is less than half of the total outlay. Secondly, with the budgetary transfers there are also other impediments. For instance one of the main head of income are profits from receipts from the transfer of profits from hydel generation of electricity. This is a constitutionally mandated resource transfer provided for under Article 161 of the constitution. The first payment of Rs. 6 billion then amounting to approximately \$ 200 million was paid to KP in 1990-91 and constituted almost 39% of the total budgetary resource of the province. Most of this sum was invested in the human development and social protection

sectors. However, the federation refused to enhance this amount ever since that period. As the graph below shows, in 2008-9 the value of the transfer to the province is now worth only \$74 million and provides less than 5% of the total budgetary receipts.<sup>16</sup>



If the KP government received less in terms of resources then there was little it could do in terms of improving the socio-development indicators. It may be argued that surely the lack of resources cannot explain the absence of adequate policies that would have helped create more space for the poor with less money; that is reduction of financial liabilities by reducing recruitment in government, improving the efficiency in the delivery of services by better monitoring and controls, involving the private sector in the delivery of services, reducing wastage and discouraging corruption; surely these measures required reform and innovation and not more money. This is sadly true; Swat and its people have suffered as a result of an absence of a reforming framework. There cannot be any justification for failure of governance in a situation where any slackness on the part of the government can be used by the militants to their advantage.

In the survey, the Swat households were asked whether an increase in the provision of services for the people led to an increase in the support for the government. 67% agreed that it did (Annex-1, Fig 12). From this discussion it is clear that the condition of families in Swat worsened from 2001 onwards. As the government failed to compensate the poor, their loyalty to the government and the State also declined. Under these circumstances is it surprising to find the people rising against their government when the time came?

## E. Is there a poverty - militancy nexus?

The households in Swat perceived that there was link between poverty and militancy. This relationship came out quite clearly during the survey. The following were the survey results:

- A large number of unemployed youth show that the income levels will be poor and is thus a sure sign of poverty. Most of the unemployed are youth who have received some form of education from either the government school system or the Madressahs. As they expect to get jobs and to raise families they find that their chances of employment are non-existent. They constitute a large group of youth who are drifting endlessly in circles looking for an opportunity to make a living so that they can start a family. Unfortunately for them such opportunities are few. This creates frustration and a desire to change the system forcibly.
- In 2001 an opportunity arose that had its roots in the Al-Qaeda challenge to the US. The attack on the Twin Towers began a war that despite denials looks more and more a war between the Muslims on one side and the Christians and Jews on the other. One of the aims of the Al-Qaeda is to remove governments in the Islamic world that are friendly to US. Since the Pakistani government supports the US, the Al-Qaeda through Pakistani Jihadist parties began targeting the Pakistani state through a well planned strategy. Swat was selected as one of the core areas by the Islamists to confront the Pakistani state. The following are the factors that encouraged them to select Swat as a base for confrontation:
  - Swat is a populous district with high mountains and a population that is religious with a belief in Jihad generated by their history. The survey supported this connection of the Swati with religion. In response to a question, 58% of the responding households said that they supported the militants on ground of religion (Annex-1, Fig 46).
  - Secondly, Pakistani state policy of supporting a Jihadist hard core came to haunt her. During the Afghan Jihad many of the Afghan fighters and others belonging to Pakistani militant outfits like the LeT and JM were kept in camps in Maidan in Dir district. However, after Sufi Mohammad's lashkar suffered deaths when he took more than 9,000 persons from Malakand to fight against the US forces in Afghanistan in 2001 resulted in creating hatred against the Jihadis many of whom were Afghans.
  - In November 2001 the military shifted these Jihadi camps from Dir to Peachor in the mountains of Swat to prevent the people from attacking the Afghans in these camps in Dir. Peachor provided a new area to the Jihadis in which to create another terrorist infrastructure. In 2009 when the military operations began against



the Swat militants, some of the toughest fighting was in Peachor. It was also here that the military suffered its heaviest casualties. It is indeed ironic that the Jihadist monster attacked its creator!

- Thirdly, the nuisance value of Sufi Mohammad's TNSM was exploited by elements from within the security agencies to embarrass the civilian governments from 1994 to 1999 through the Panjpiri engine of Wahabism that is kept stoked and primed in district Swabi. This weakened the already poor writ of the state in Malakand that is discussed more fully latter in the chapter on governance.
- Insecurity combined with poverty, unemployment and tension related to matters of land, and exploitation of tenants and peasants by landlords in Swat, formed a formidable sea of discontent. During the survey, households were asked if people joined the militants for the sake of employment. A resounding 75% thought that unemployment forced the youth to join the militants (Annex-1, Fig 40).
- In a penetrating analysis it was found that one way in which income inequality may contribute to militancy is the better life options possibility that become available by joining the militant ranks to be a somebody in society.<sup>17</sup>
- It was also apparent that many people joined the militants to improve their livelihoods by using the terrorist hierarchy in a leadership role so that they were enabled to share in the spoils that the terrorists collected or looted. According to the result of the survey 63% of the households agreed with this view (Annex-1, Fig 39).
- A strange finding to emerge from the survey was when some key informants disclosed that besides the enrichment of terrorists that became possible after cutting the trees of the rich landlords or destroying and looting rich household, was the money made by selling the rubble of destroyed schools and hospitals. It denied the use of government buildings in time of war. When the troops came to fight, the buildings became operational bases and rest and recreation centers. Hence destroying them denied space to the military while the rubble could be sold to earn livelihoods.
- At the same time we find that manipulation by intelligence agencies to protect their Jihadi infrastructure ensured that the terrorists continued to prosper and even grow and contest territory. It is ironic that despite so many rebellions against the state, Sufi Mohammad and his ilk continue to prosper without a trial under sedition and rebellion against the state. Until such people are brought to justice and prosecuted the situation will not improve.

- On Feb 12, 1994 the Supreme Court of Pakistan made a land mark decision ordering the government of KP that Malakand Division should not be governed under special provisions since these were discriminatory and violative of the Fundamental Rights provided under the Constitution. Both the Federal and Provincial governments choose to ignore what was a far reaching decision. Instead of implementing it, the government let matters drift. Sufi Mohammad who had returned from Afghanistan after spending time with the Taliban in Kabul created the TNSM to counter the attempt by the Supreme Court decision to mainstream Malakand; Circumstantial audience suggests that he was manipulated into doing so by different forces interested in maintaining the status quo in Swat.
- The following were the main parties in this matter by relying on expediency that prevented the mainstreaming of Swat and created space for the militants:
  - The political parties were interested in breaking the hold of the Jamat e Islami in the region and they wanted to use Sufi Mohammad as a weapon for this purpose.
  - The industrialists wanted to continue receiving benefits like exemption from payment of taxes and customs duty.
  - The intelligence agencies wanted Swat to be kept safe as a training and camping ground for Jihadis
  - Bureaucrats wanted to retain their unfettered powers and did not want to any restrain on their powers.
  - In order to create a strategic group of supporter the landlords of Swat were allowed to keep their large vehicles without payment of custom duties. There are some 22,000 of such luxury vehicles. The presences of these vehicles were prominent in almost all of Sufi Muhammad's gatherings till 2009. Was he supported by the rich landlords to evade taxes?
- In 1994 Sufi Mohammad launched the TNSM demanding the introduction of Shariah. He was treated with kid gloves by the government and the political government was persuaded to negotiate with him. His intentions can be judged from the fact that he was kept in the Dir Scout mess in Chakdara, after more than 40 persons were killed in a shootout between the workers of the TNSM and security services on 6th Nov, 1994. He refused to negotiate unless a photograph of the father of the nation Mr. Jinnah was first removed from the room.

- Due to the pressure of the various lobbies within the government and the vested interest who did not want the introduction of the normal law of the land, the government appeased Sufi Mohammad by introducing the PATA (Nifaz e Nizame Shariah) Regulation 1994. Since this regulation was procedural, the TNSM was dissatisfied.
- In 1999 the government again surrendered to the TNSM pressure after it led another agitation against the government. The government issued another ineffective version of Shariah the Nifaz e Adl Regulation 1999. This was again procedural in Swat and did not bring any substantial change. Although the government and Sufi Mohammad were playing a cat and mouse game, the delay in the dispensation of justice by the courts had become a point of serious concern for the residents of Swat whose cases kept on being delayed.
- The seriousness of the issue and desire for quick and expeditious justice by the households in Swat came out very clearly in the survey. 78% of respondents felt that many people joined the militants to have their grievances addressed, (Annex-1, Fig 32). This indeed is a serious indictment of the government.
- However a question that arises is whether the militants are really serious in bringing about change in the laws. In order to buy traction for their Islamic rhetoric amongst the people it is essential for militants to demand the imposition of Shariah law. However the militants are wise enough to realize that they would not be permitted to have a law of their desire since the nub of the matter is that the religious elements would like to become judges themselves for the dispensation of Shariah. Apparently, it is not as much a matter of imposition of Shariah but to use its slogan for creating an economic niche. That would result creating in jobs for religious scholars.

# CHAPTER 6

## LAND OWNERSHIP & MILITANCY

### A. Introduction

The households in Swat were unanimous in their response to questions related to poverty and development. Our FGDs and key informant interviews told the same tale of the failure of the State to provide services in education, health and other sectors to the people of Swat. As a result of this deficit the population of Swat was exposed to increasing *vulnerability* due to underdevelopment; such vulnerability is the reverse side of human *marginality*. It is immaterial whether marginality is spatial or related to an individual; marginality makes any society brittle and open to fragmentation.

Swat as noted is an example where both human and spatial marginality coincided and resulted in the creation of the necessary conditions for the breakdown of the system. This did not happen overnight, but was a slow process that came into being as many centuries before Swat was merged in 1969, into Pakistan. Subsequently due to poor managements of policies Swat was deprived of developing her full potential. We now examine the role of the lack of land asset as a basic reason for the impoverishment of a large population.

### B. The centrality of land issue in swat

Swat has a unique background and if we want to understand the reason why movements anchored within a religious narrative find space and followers in this region of Malakand, one has only to study its history. In the last decade of the fifteenth century, Swat was in the possession of a mixed race of people who were loosely called the Swati Pakhtuns. There is no genealogical classification of this population except the fact that it was the name given to the people of Swat who dwelt there since time immemorial. These people had over centuries integrated into the regional gene pool that can be loosely characterized as Pakhtun and contained a sprinkling of other races inhabiting this part of the North West Indian Sub-Continent.

In 1480, Sultān Uwais was the chief ruler of Swat. The Yusufzais who had been pushed out of the area around Kabul came to Swat and established matrimonial relations with the

Sultān but had actually set their eyes to conquer the valley for its rich land and flowing waters. They displaced the Swatis and forcefully occupied Lower Swat. By the sixteenth century the whole of Lower Swat was in their possession. Later they expanded further and in the process defeated Mughal armies sent by Emperor Akbar who wanted to establish his suzerainty over them.<sup>18</sup> After the conquest of Swat, the lands were taken over by the Yusufzai military nobility and distributed amongst themselves; the Swatis who originally possessed these lands were scattered into the mountains.

Obviously, the original inhabitants who in this case formed the local nobility predating the invasion were *marginalized*. They either left Swat valley and settled in the mountains extending towards Bajaur and Kashmir or occupied the slopes of mountains around Swat. Many of them were employed as tenants by the new occupiers. They are today called Swatis in Mansehra and Kaghan or Gujjars and Kohistanis within Swat. Both the later terms are considered to be pejorative. Although the Kohistanis contain a large body of the local aboriginal stock, yet they also include many of the refugees who had fled Swat after the Yusufzai invasion.

This history has not been forgotten by those who were dispossessed. If we fast forward the narrative to the period 1918-69, when Swat was finally merged into Pakistan we see that the ruler of the State had proscribed the holding of lands by the Gujjars and the Kohistanis in the fertile valley of Swat. This account indicates the presence of a form of land based and racial apartheid in operation where the nobility was composed of the Yusufzais while the non Yusufzais formed the lower classes in society.

During the period of terrorist rule in Swat from 2004 to September 2009 when the military re-established control, there was a lot of violence committed against the local feudal landlords. Many of them like Shujat Ali Khan left their farms and homes and took refuge in other parts of the country. It was only Afzal Khan one of the most renowned landlord of the area and belonging to Dureshkhela, who at the risk of his life resisted the onslaught of the terrorists. In one of the attacks he was severely injured. He also lost many family members. The Yusufzai gentry of Swat lost family members, homes, land and influence.

There is ample proof that for Fazlullah and the Taliban movement in Swat the re-distribution of property occupied an important place. It was evident that the promise of land distribution

attracted many followers to Fazalullah's movement and which started capturing the orchards, farms and other lands of the Khans or local leaders and land owners.<sup>19</sup>

These attacks on propertied individuals not only caused severe losses but also indicated the weakness in the security policies of the government as it failed to protect lives and property.

Clearly, when the Swat terrorists showed their initial hand in 2004, they had the blessings of the MMA government according to FGDs discussants and the key informants who were interviewed during the survey. Such support emboldened the terrorists who became more blatant in confronting the State knowing full well that they had the government's sympathy; it also reduced the risk of confrontation. The list of occurrences where the land lords were abused and the state kept quiet includes the names of important landlords and political figures of Swat who were victimized on the basis of class and perhaps race:

- The family of the former ruler of Swat fled the district early on when the violence erupted in 2005
- The former Provincial Education Minister and ex Nazim of the District as well as a grandson of the former ruler of Swat, Asfandiyar Amirzeb was killed on 27th December 2007 when his car was blown away by an IED planted by the terrorists.
- Two nephews of Afzal Khan discussed earlier Zakir Khan, Naib Nazim of Tehsil Matta and Zahir Khan were killed in an ambush, while their uncle Abdul Jabbar Khan the Tesil Nazim of Matta was severely injured.
- Another prominent Yusufzai family of Swat namely Khan Bahadur Khan of Sher Palam and Nazar Abad in Tehsil Matta represented by former provincial Ministers Shujat Ali Khan and his brother Fateh Mohammad Khan and Jamal Nasir the District Nazim of Swat left in early 2007. Their houses were burnt and their land was distributed amongst the tenants and peasants. Their extensive fruit farms were damaged and the fruit trees were chopped for timber.
- Wajid Ali Khan another notable person from the Yusufzais and who is the current Minister of Environment in the KP government faced many attempts on his life while his brother Farooq Khan, a police officer was killed.
- Four family members of the sitting ANP legislator, Waqar Khan including his elder brother Iqbal Khan were killed in August 2008, after the terrorists had besieged the family. This was despite the fact that security forces were present on the surrounding hills as well as the Shah Dherai High School nearby!

- Sher Khan of Gwaleray in Tehsil Matta who was the general secretary of the ruling People's Party suffered grievously when thirteen of his family members were killed. He survives but is badly crippled and hospitalized.
- Afreen Khan of Gwaleray, a leader of a pro- government lashkar was ambushed and killed along with three of his family members near Koza Bandai
- One of the most barbarous acts in this sorry episode was the execution by the terrorist of one of their own – Pir Samiullah himself a Gujjar, and who had become the head of pro-government lashkar to fight against the terrorist was executed after torture along with forty nine of his supporters in Mandal Daag on December 16, 2008 when the ANP-PPP government was firmly in control. Tragically the Provincial Government and the military failed to provide protection to him despite clear warnings that an atrocity was in the making. His corpse was dug from the grave and dragged on roads to terrorize others. The hatred and vengeance shown in this case reflected the anger of the terrorists against one of their own – a Gujjar who was siding with the Khans and the government.
- Shamsher Khan another legislator of the ruling ANP was killed when he was attacked by a suicide bomber in the end of November 2009.

It is abundantly clear that the rise of terrorism in Swat cannot be explained as a phenomenon that is linked to the demand for Shariah in Malakand or the call for the larger Jihad to fight against the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan. It also cannot be explained as a sympathetic act by radical groups to ease the pressure by the Pakistani military by opening another front in Swat – although the TTP has been requesting likeminded groups to that. The following responses by the house holds throw light on the issues that include involved poor socio-economic conditions:

- 85% of the respondents were of the view that there is link between poor socio-economic status and militancy (Annex-1, Fig 38). The point to be noted here is that poverty also created in this rigid Pakhtun society social status. Thus it is important to be reasonably monetized to clam the full identity if a Pakhtun.
- In answer to another question 56% of the respondents were of the view that there was a tense class relationship between the rich and the poor (Annex-1, Fig 41).
- The two sets of results above clearly indicate that there is a serious underlying class tension between the landed aristocracy and the tenants as well as the peasantry. A counter argument against the existence of the class thesis where influence in Swat is based on land ownership may be raised and it be asked that if the Yusufzai nobility

was based on land ownership created by dispossessing the aboriginals, then in that case there should be no poor Yusufzai who was a tenant or a peasant! On the face of it this argument would hold ground. However, the Yusufzai land distribution and land holding rules in Swat provide a clue why the existence of an impoverished Yusufzai tenancy/ peasantry was possible since the rules of land ownership and distribution made such a condition essential. To understand this we need to look at the system of land distribution and land ownership in Swat.

### C. System of land ownership in Swat

After the Yusufzai occupation of Swat in the last quarter of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, land in the new territories was distributed under the peculiar system of *Wesh*. Its main attributes were:

- Lands were allotted to members of each sub tribe for a number of years varying from 7-10 years and a parcel of holding under a Yusufzai's possession was known as a *Dawter*.
- The lands were re-distributed after each period amongst all the tribes except those allotted to the religious caste and called *Serai*.
- If you were a Gujjar you were considered a non Pakhtun and thus not entitled to a share in land.
- In case one was a weak individual normally the powerful dispossessed such a person from this land. That person was considered a non Pakhtun. Thus loss of possession meant the loss of Pakhtun identity too!
- It was a system that encouraged war amongst the tribes at the time of distribution and the period in between - for one's next share of land depended on one's current land holding, irrespective of the fact how one got into its possession whether by murder or force! It also discouraged capital formation and the building of the irrigation and agricultural infrastructure since after a few years someone else would possess that land.
- The Wali of Swat ended this system and made a permanent settlement that took four years from 1925-29. However, records show that in some villages this absurd system prevailed even as late as 1990.<sup>20</sup>

Many households in Swat are still in denial of the fact that class differences in Swat had a role in fanning the militancy that was witnessed there. When the respondents were asked whether class differences in Swat had fanned militancy, 45% said yes it did while a big 44%



said that they didn't know, and 11% thought that there was no role of class difference in creating the militancy (Annex-1, Fig 42).

There was more recognition of the fact that the past denial of the right of land ownership to the Gujjars (non Yusufzais) had a role in igniting the violence in Swat. 56% of the Swat households were of the opinion that the denial of land ownership to the Gujjars made them more militant and prone to violence (Annex-1, Fig 43). The situation that clearly emerges is plain. Socio economic differences created by the complex issues of status and identity is a dominant cause of the conflict in Swat and land ownership pattern in the district must be considered as a pivotal factor in fanning unrest and violence in this region.

It may be noted that every situation creates a survival strategy for those whose niche to exist is denied. It may take many generations to create a pattern shift but the saga of possession and dispossession has occurred frequently in the Pushtun belt in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As narrated later there was a school of thought in un-divided India who felt that unless the Muslim community was organized for Jihad it will be submerged and lose its identity. It was under this fear that an alignment of thought was made with the Takfiri thinking and the Deoband seminary was formed in 1866.

Whatever may be said about the principles of Jihad – yet it remains a very powerful set of principles that will come onto play when a Muslim community feels threatened.

This is said after reflection and analysis of the factors operating in Muslim societies. The Madressah, Mullah and the Alim will remain influential and powerful as long as Muslim societies remain unjust and economically impoverished. The reason for this is because if someone is marginalized in Muslim society he can empower himself by joining an influential Madressah. After he has graduated that person becomes highly empowered and a leader for the downtrodden. Normally, such a person begins his ascent by creating a following and if he has been to the Oxford or Cambridge equivalent of a Madressah, he emerges after a few years as a leader with a standing and stature in society and abiding good wishes of the community that he leads. Governments that are disconnected with their own people are afraid of the power of the Madressah. However, better Madressahs reflect the collective conscience of society and their strength in a society is an indicator of the failure of a Muslim

state to look after its citizens. At the same time Madressahs offer a chance of social mobility and empowerment to the marginalized that have been shut out by the elites. Madressahs are an antidote to hopelessness and will keep any Muslim society afloat at a certain level of performance. Thus the Madressah alumni are a formidable group and once instituted they become autonomous and self generating.

- 67% of respondent households agreed there is a close connection between religious education and militancy (Annex-1, Fig 44).
- 84% of respondents said that the Madressah students were more prone to militancy (Annex-1, Fig 45).

## D. Swat politics

Due to the nature of the Yusufzai conquest of the valley in the last quarter of the 16<sup>th</sup> century Swat has always reflected the strength of the feudal aristocracy. It held its sway over politics and societal influence. Even after the horrendous experiences of the residents of the district at the hand of terrorists and the intermittent violence during the last decade, the Swat elites have not yet learnt any lessons and rebounded back as a class in the 2008 general election. They won all the seven seats to the provincial legislature as well as the two national legislature seats. The seven provincial legislative seats were won by the ruling ANP party which has formed a coalition with the PPP. The table below provides the data of the member in parliament and also indicates the sources of their wealth which invariably is tied to land:

**Table: Details regarding current members of parliament belonging to Swat**

S.No	Name	National / Provincial	Party Affiliation	Location	Status
1	Muzafar ul Mulk	National	ANP	Manglawer	Landlord
2	Syed Allaudin Bacha	National	PPP	Mangultan	Landlord
3	Ghafar Shah	Provincial	ANP	Madayan	Landlord
4	Haider Ali	Provincial	ANP	Khwaza Khela	Landlord
5	Ayab Asharray	Provincial	ANP	Matta	Landlord

6	Rahmat Ali Khan	Provincial	ANP	Khanju	Landlord
7	Waqar Khan	Provincial	ANP	Shahdaray	Landlord
8	Wajid Ali Khan	Provincial	ANP	Mingora	Landlord
9	Sher Shah Khan	Provincial	ANP	Gogdara	Landlord

The conclusion that emerges from the analysis regarding *marginalization* of people due to land asset distribution is that it will remain a serious generator of crisis in the future as well unless political and other reforms occur that provide space to the marginalized. Some suggested solutions are:

- Society in Swat will remain polarized unless there are land reforms or land distribution amongst the peasantry and tenants. The declaration of land reforms as un-Islamic by the Federal Shariah Court in a decision in 1980 is regressive as it will contribute to constant de-stabilization of the Pakistani state structure. According to a study 58% of the rural population living in KP has no land and out of this number 70% of such persons are in the bottom most quintile.<sup>21</sup>
- In Islam the protection of the State is a higher good in religion than declarations that are self defeating. One report has suggested that the level of inequality in Pakistan is increasing rapidly and needs to be reduced through more direct measures. Two direct measures identified in one important study is the need immediate for fiscal and land reforms.<sup>22</sup>
- The KP political parties can play a major role in starting a drive for new members amongst the peasantry and tenants in Swat. If such people can be brought into the mainstream of political life and given representation in the legislature, one could project that such a measure will reduce tension in the future. However, if the political parties and the Yusufzai aristocracy are short sighted then there will be a reaction that will be both political and militant and worse than previous episodes.

It is thus clear that one of the main driver of terrorism that is deeply embedded into the conundrum of Swat is the hurt suffered by the aboriginals because of their historical dispossession from lands that occurred during the Yusufzai invasion of Swat and the consequent immiserization of a large number of Swatis and Kohistani people many of whom were the former nobility.

Evidently, the WoT provides an excuse for some to make a call for Jihad and for others to seek implementation of Shariah. However, one of the main causes for the violence seen in Swat is related to the issue of land.

According to this analysis the fuse lit now will keep on burning as long as the grievance of the tenants and the peasantry related to demand for land is not addressed. The situation in Swat though may be calm at the moment, is extremely volatile in the long term.

# CHAPTER 7

## GOVERNANCE

### A. Introduction

If one carried out an analysis of the main reasons for the growth and continuation of the insurgency in Swat and FATA some obvious factors come to notice that definitely have a bearing on the future and how the insurgency will turn out. One thing can be stated without any doubt and that is that such movements are not external to us. They have their roots within Pakistan.

All that has happened is that an external stimulus provided the last destabilizing particle of sand on top of the heap of deficits and faults that finally moved the heap into an avalanche. According to this analysis the following important factors in the field of history, governance, and economics are the main causes for creating and driving the conflict in Swat. They remain valid for the foreseeable future:

- This part of the sub-continent was selected by the faction of concerned Muslims of the sub continent who believed in Wahabism to launch a Jihad against the Sikhs in the KP and later the British who took over the suzerainty from them. This call for Jihad originated after the East India Company won the Battle of Plassey in 1757. The Indian Muslims through the family of Shah Waliullah began a movement to protect Islam in India. The center of this movement was in Patna in Eastern India.
- According to this narrative the leaders of this movement decided that they would provide the leadership while the Pashtuns of the Frontier will do the fighting against the Sikhs and later the British. Syed Ahmed who was the leader of the Patna Jihadis traveled with a band of fighters to the Frontier via Sind, Baluchistan and Afghanistan before entering Peshawar via the Khyber Pass in 1826<sup>23</sup>. They established Jihadist camps at various places in KP including Sitana in Hazara and in the Buner mountains of Malakand. They fought against the Sikhs and British in different areas including Swat, Buner and Hazara. They practiced a Wahabist version of Islam and were the followers of the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya based on Salafi doctrine. Ibn Taymiyya defined Jihad as “unrelenting struggle against all who stood in the way of Islam’s destiny.”<sup>24</sup>

- The theory of Jihad and Salafism was institutionalized at Deoband seminary near Delhi. It is one of the most effective institutions that taught Salafist Jihad. One of Deoband's most renowned students was Maulana Mahmood ul Hasan. He founded *Samaratut Tarbiyat* in 1877 after graduating from Deoband and that became the training school for *fedayeen*. Pakistan's Jui (Jamaat Ulema Islam) and its leaders Fazlur Rehman and Samiul Haq remain the highly effective controllers of Jihad in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- Interestingly, when Amir Abdur Rehman became the Ruler of Afghanistan he too promoted the application of Jihad against the British.<sup>25</sup> Thus historically the Pathans of Afghanistan and Pakistan act in unison. Subsequently, it was the Jui who led the formation of the Jihadi fighting groups in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion of December 1979. They were the teachers of the Afghan Taliban and remained very close to Bin Laden. They worked closely with the Saudi cleric Bin Baz who spread the influence of Salafism and spent \$ 70 billion on Islamist missionary work – he helped establish 10,000 Madressahs in Pakistan by assisting the Jui and other parties.<sup>26</sup>
- Abdullah Azaam the savant of Salafist Jihad and Bin Laden's mentor was a part of this network. His definitive Fatwa, "*Defense of the Muslim Land*," issued in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, is a masterful exposition of the duty of Muslims when confronted with invasion of their land.
- It may be noted that it was the Jui coalition that ruled KP from 2002-2007. They were the teachers of Jihad! It was indeed illogical for the security policy planners not to note this link, unless they wanted to stoke the flames of militancy! That the insurgency in both Pakistan and Afghanistan grew into a formidable opposition for the West is mainly due to the influence of the Jui in KP from 2002-2007. Thus from the viewpoint of Salafist Islam they performed an outstanding service but in doing so the Pakistani state was de-stabilized and many people lost their lives and properties.
- Discussions with Jui leaders indicate that their aim is to see a Jui flag on houses on both sides of a Durand Line that separate Afghanistan from Pakistan. Recently a Jui legislature in the KP assembly called for abolition of family planning as it was preventing the birth of more Jihadis and was thus un-Islamic.<sup>27</sup>
- As noted before Swat was radicalized two hundred years ago when Syed Ahmed and his Jihadi warriors first came to fight the British when they began their Forward Policy of expanding into Chitral. The people of Swat and Buner fought against the British in the Malakand operations of 1897 under the banner of Sartor Mullah. Thus the people of Swat given their historical links will act in reflex mode

once the call for Jihad is given. 83% of the households in Swat said that they are influenced by religious personalities (Annex-1, Fig 47).

- During the household survey the reaction of the respondents clearly reflected reactions of a mindset that can be influenced by the Islamist narrative. For instance households were asked their reactions about the attacks by drones. It must be noted that as of today there has been no drone attack on Swat, although there have been attacks on Bajaur. Households said they were enraged by drone strikes. 67% said that they felt angry while 33% said that they did not know (Annex-1, Fig 13).
- The links between the Swat militants and the Afghan Taliban were confirmed, 70% of the respondent households confirmed that the Swat militants were helped by the Afghan Taliban who most likely came via Kunar and Bajaur to provide support (Annex-1, Fig 14). This situation parallels that of 1897 when the Afghans thought that the British were preparing to surround them when they moved into Chitral. Amir Abdur Rehman let it be known that there was need to call for a Jihad to prevent the expansion by Britain. A similar situation prevailed when US forces invaded Afghanistan in Nov 2001. 59 % of the households in Swat said that the US presence in Afghanistan increased support for the militants in Swat (Annex-1, Fig 15). This was further confirmed by households when 67% replied in the affirmative and said that the call for Jihad against the US invasion of Afghanistan increased support for the militants in Swat (Annex-1, Fig 16). In answer to another question 78% of the households felt that Pakistan's support to US in the war on terror was fuelling support for the militants (Annex-1, Fig 17).
- The linkage between the US presence in Afghanistan and the call for Jihad confirms the findings of Lt Col Malevich, who got it right when he wrote, "Islam, piety, and the power of the mullah are important aspects of life and culture in Afghanistan and may have more to do with fueling and driving the insurgency than we have acknowledged to date. Our failure to recognize this and address this dynamic will ensure our failure in Afghanistan and the region. We are not facing a mere political power struggle which is fueled by poverty, but rather a social and religious struggle that is powered by nothing less than jihad. This jihad has the potential to be more powerful than any Afghan government or tribe. In fact, jihad is the Hail-Mary play that could prove to be the game changer in Afghanistan."<sup>28</sup>

In a recent editorial published in Pakistan, the writer after lamenting the slide of Pakistan into the category of a failed state proposed the following steps to push the country back to health. The following were the areas in which change was needed:<sup>29</sup>

- Religious extremism must be combated with all of the State's might. This also calls for breaking the links of the security services with the Jihadist parties who have

thrived on being a closet partner of military adventurers. For instance, the Kargil fiasco was not possible had the military accepted civilian supremacy.

- It is proposed that Pakistan should create a zone of peace in her neighborhood instead it wants to dominate it through proxy wars in India or Afghanistan. This pulls away funds from development further marginalizing the people and providing internal recruits to the Jihadi elements. The location of Jihadi camps in Dir and later in Peochar in Swat led to radicalization of the region with its concomitant destructive effects. Some of the survey results in this context are the following:
- To a question, 59% of the Swat households said that the presence of militant camps in Swat helped the militancy. Clearly the presence of militant camps ultimately leads to violence (Annex-1, Fig 55).
- 56% of the households said that there was interference in Swat by Waziristan militants (Annex-1, Fig 57).
- 64% of households clearly stated that the presence of Afghan refugees helped militancy (Annex-1, Fig 52). In the answer to these questions we can conclude that Waziristan militants who operate under the TTP operated in Swat thus conceding that Mauvi Fazlullah had a link with them and that he was a part of the TTPs bigger design to establish an Emirate in this region.
- 61% of the households stated that there was presence of foreign militants. This was in reference to the presence of non Pakhtun militants. According to subsequent interviews with the community it was clarified that this referred to militants from Punjab (Annex-1, Fig 54).
- It is also evident that Pakistan acted most casually when the Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban disintegrated in Afghanistan in Nov 2001 and were allowed sanctuary in parts of FATA. It was the trained elements from these camps in Waziristan, who then spread to the districts and even assisted Swat militants from 2006-2009. During the survey 70% of the households stated that the Afghan Taliban assisted Swat militants (Annex-1, Fig 14). 59% of households said that the Bajaur militants also provided support to Swat militants (Annex-1, Fig 53). Clearly the people of Swat were thrown as crumbs to the Jihadis who were located in Dir and later in Swat as that is where the initial Jihadis many of whom were Afghan refugees came from.
- The third recommendation made was that Pakistan must improve its governance that included security, governance, dispensation of justice and sectoral policy reforms. As this paper argues elsewhere, the failure to remove spatial, social and economic marginalization will definitely lead to the creation of tension, violence, and increases



the scope for militancy. Failure to reform FATA and fear of amending and retiring Article 247 of the Constitution is a mistake. This provision is an engine of destabilization of the Pakistani political framework and is a major element creating, encouraging and then stoking the fire of militancy. It is rightly said that we inflict many of the evils ourselves.

Conceded that the Afghan Taliban and bin Laden have their agendas to fulfill, but we too have helped them whether purposely or otherwise by not reforming. On the other hand Pakistan carried out risky reforms for instance when Gen. Musharraf and his cabal including Gen. Mahmood the head of the ISI in 2001 and Gen. Naqvi the chairman of the National Reconstruction Bureau took the high risk and destabilizing administrative reforms decision that removed the administrative shield that protected the state at the district and sub-divisional level when the WoT began on 9/11. This was a disastrous reform. These changes in the realm of governance speak of self inflicted wounds on the body of the state. We now examine another very important factor that led to the crisis in Swat.

## **B. Islam and Pakistani state**

- Pakistan has been a state for 63 years. However, the issue of its identity remains to be determined. The Pakistan freedom movement within undivided India began as a secular movement within the Islamic sub continental framework of a softer version of Islam. A version of Islam where Muslim rulers like the Mughal Emperor Akbar married into non-Muslim Hindu nobility and also had non Muslim advisors like Raja Todar Mall and Birbal who incidentally died in Buner while leading an army against the recalcitrant Yusufzai of Swat was a good example of multi religious harmony in Mughal India.
- However, after the arrival of the East India Company and the replacement of the Mughal Muslim monarchy by the British, the Muslim decline started. Some learned Muslim families who were anchored within Islamic religious teachings (like Shah Waliullah's) began to see the colonial intervention in terms of an existentialist threat to Islam.
- After the barbaric reprisals by the British against the Muslim nobility of Delhi and other parts of India, the Muslims realized that the new Imperial masters of India were desirous only of Muslim destruction and humiliation. As a result of this feeling they gave a call for Jihad. It is open to conjecture whether the call for Jihad against Britain was made after the Battle of Plassey in 1757 when Britain entered Muslim Bengal or in 1857 after the massacre of the Muslims and their dispossession from property after the war of independence. However evidence available suggests that the call for Jihad

preceded the events of 1857. One piece of such evidence was the arrival at Syed Ahmed in Peshawar in Nov 1826.

- However, the advent of Jihadism in Swat, Buner, and neighboring areas of Hazara occurred with the appearance of what were called the “Hindustani Jihadis” in Peshawar in Nov 1826, under the leadership of Syed Ahmed. The Yusufzais of the region in Peshawar and Buner who had been victims of Sikh onslaught and many hundreds had been slain became followers of Syed Ahmed.
- After arrival of Syed Ahmed and his group, the Yusufzais gave the mantle of Jihad to Syed Ahmed. He was made Amirul Momineen of the faithful and also provided refuge in Buner as well as provided land in Sittani in Hazara by the renowned Jihadist Syed Akbar Shah. The story of this Jihad and its achievements has remained the center of a religious discourse in FATA and KP and Swat ever since then.
- Since the people are superstitiously religious in FATA and KP, a call for Jihad does not go wasted. However, other parts of Pakistan follow a softer version of Islam. Here “shrine and the mosque” are evenly balanced; there is a blend in of sub continental social customs, veneration of saints by praying at their shrines and the observance of the ritualistic Islam in the mosques. It was thus a live and let live type of Islam.
- However, the events preceding Pakistan’s Independence changed the paradigm. Pakistani pre Independence leadership did not place the role of religion in the new state into a central position. The leader of the movement Mohammad Ali Jinnah advocated a secular Pakistan where Islam will have prominence because of its Muslim majority but that was the only concession he was willing to make. However, the strong religious faction in the Pakistan movement believed that the new country should be an Islamic state.
- Events show that mobilization for Pakistan was ineffective prior to the passage of the Lahore Resolution in March 1940. According to the resolution Pakistan was to be a homeland for Muslims and an Islamic state. Khalid bin Sayyid, Pakistan’s eminent historian of the period said that it was only after the passage of this Resolution that people joined the demand for Pakistan in droves. That clearly showed that whatever the feelings of the Muslim League may have been the Muslims of India were mobilized once the slogan of Islam was raised.<sup>30</sup>
- The tussle between the secularists and Islamists has continued since then, however, the Islamists have become more powerful. Some of the issues involved here are;
  - Pakistan is caught in a debate between those who call for a selective modernity while retaining an Islamic identity on the opposing side and in

larger members are those who hold a conservative view of Islam especially the Deobandi strain that calls for religious orthodoxy as well as defending Islamic lands through Jihad.

- In 1947 when India and Pakistan went to war over Kashmir, the army officers and state media declared the war a Jihad. This led to the creation of lashkars from the tribal areas that went to Kashmir to fight the Indian army in the name of Islam.
- In 1949 the Pakistani Constituent assembly passed the Objective Resolution in 1949. It called for Pakistani laws to be in consonance with Islam. It thus brought religion into Pakistani statecraft. The state began to be turned around so that its management would be according to Islamic narrative based on the Quran and Sunnah.
- In the initial phases, Pakistan faced many threats from India and its leaders invariably mobilized the nation on the basis of Jihad. In 1953 the religious parties in Pakistan showed their ascendancy when they created mass unrest in Lahore demanding that the Ahmedi sect to be declared as non-Muslims. This was the first test of a Takfiri (apostasy) declaration against fellow citizens. Takfirism as a doctrine goes back to the 13th century Islamist jurist Ibn Taymiyya. According to him Jihad was much more than a matter of military defense. It was a war against those who did not follow the call of Islam and disobeyed its rules of ritual! His teachings are against those preached by the Prophet (Pbuh).
- In the 1965 war with India the idea of Jihad and stories of soldiers sacrificing their lives in suicide attacks were frequently used to motivate the people.
- In 1963 even a supposedly “liberal” President like Ayub Khan said that since Pakistan was formed in the name of Islam it thus had an ideology that will make the people good defenders of their homeland!
- In the 1971 war against India the Pakistani narrative of war was formulated in Jihadist terminology. Gen Niazi the Pakistani commander in East Pakistan said that the spirit of Jihad will defeat the enemies of Islam! He lost the war and surrendered to the Indian military!
- Even the socialist Bhutto was trapped within the Islamist rhetoric of the majority thought. He defined his country’s bid for nuclear weapons as a bid for an “Islamic bomb.” Ironically he was removed by a rightist alliance of religious parties, despite doing a lot for the Muslim world.

- Gen Zia ul Haq who was made the army commander by Mr. Bhutto changed the army's motto into an Islamic declaration of Iman (faith), Takwa (piety) and Jihad fe sabil Allah (Jihad in the name of Allah). Thus the thinking within the military became pro Islamist and the officer Corp began thinking beyond their boundaries and extending Islam by Jihad.
- After the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan Pakistan's Gen Zia ul Haq who had hanged Bhutto led a fight against the Soviet Union based on creating Jihadist militant organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan became the home of Jihad. Zia ul Haq was a committed Jihadist and made it a part of Pakistani Policy.
- Zia ul Haq changed Pakistan's liberal and secularized legal system by giving supremacy over the Constitution and legislative to religion based on the Quran and Sunnah. He amended law that permitted religious scholars to become judges of superior courts without being members of the bar councils. The Federal Shariah Courts could thus be loaded with supporters and could over rule the Constitution. If Zia ul Haq had his way Pakistan would most likely have been a Deobandi theocracy by now!
- Gen Musharraf's began his Kargil escapade with the assistance of LeT and JM Jihadi cadres. It is reckoned that Gen Musharraf was always a closet Jihadist with links to Jihadi organizations. Until he became President he retained back door link to Jihadists.
- After the destruction of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda infrastructure in Afghanistan, Gen Musharraf provided sanctuary to the militants in Waziristan and Bajaur. At the same time Al-Qaeda was able to create safe havens in Lahore, Faisalabad and Karachi.
- As far as Swat and KP was concerned three factors played a crucial role in radicalizing the region. These were a) installation of the MMA into power in KP from 2002 – 2007. b) Stalling security and other reforms. c) Permitting the insurgency to grow in FATA and then spread to KP.<sup>31</sup>
- The analysis narrated clearly shows that the framework for a liberal and democratic dispensation in Pakistan has eroded considerably. There are serious paradigm shifts that have occurred in the political and social framework of Pakistan that has drastically changed the balance of power in Pakistan in favor of the rightist forces. Since the military remains a conservative force the rightist combination is formidable.

- Pakistan appears to be in the stranglehold of strong Jihadist forces that are clearly represented in security and intelligence services and the rightist political forces. As the Pakistani military occupies a pre-eminent political position it controls many areas of foreign and strategic policy making reforms difficult to carry out.
- When Sufi Mohammad declared that in Islam there was no concept of parliament and party politics then why did we blame him? Didn't Gen Zia ul Haq the President of Pakistan say the same? Did he not speak in favor of Jihad? Why do we blame Sufi Mohammad and Mullah Fazalullah for demanding that Mullahs and Alims should administer justice when President Zia ul Haq led the way by appointing religious Alims as judges of the Federal Shariah Court?
- Pakistan today is a visibly de-institutionalized country when defined according to a liberal template. As Khalid Ahmed has said that Pakistan is a weak trichotomy. The division of power exists only in the Constitution. Besides the legislature, executive and judiciary there are new institutions who have entered the hallowed hall of the Constitution, by the back door. It is the military, mass media and the Jihadis. The latter three have become more powerful than the legitimate trinity and manipulate it at will.<sup>32</sup>
- In this scheme of things where does one place the events of Swat and FATA generally? Even if one gives the benefit of doubt to the military it is evident that the planners are positively inclined to the role of religion in politics. This is most unfortunate because Jihadism is not a national doctrine; it cannot be confined to the geographic limits of Pakistan. Anyone who invokes Jihad opens the path for international Islamic assistance for that cause. Clearly this is a prescription for chaos and international mayhem. Such an approach will prevent Pakistan from becoming a progressive state.

In the light of the above it is evident that the seeds of Jihad that have been sown long ago in Swat make future insurrections not only possible but definite. The worrying news is that the Jihadist contagion has entered Punjab and parts of Balochistan and has thus become too formidable to be kept in check. It is a moot point whether there is going to be any lasting peace in this region. It is most likely that insecurity will continue to persist in this area even after the US withdraws from Afghanistan. We now examine what happens when religious coalition held sway in KP from 2002-07.

## C. MMA governance

The survey was unambiguous in its finding that the provincial government of KP during the period 2003-2007 was not only sympathetic towards the militants but also ineffective in fighting them and additionally lacked the commitment to counter the militants. It could not have been otherwise since the MMA believed in Jihad as they had many Deobandis who were followers of Maulana Nanautawi the founder of the Deoband seminary (1866).<sup>33</sup> In short the provincial government was complicit in the growth of militancy in Swat. This conclusion is supported by others who found that the MMA, religious alliance ruling the KP at that period, “Aided the rise of the Taliban [in Swat].”<sup>34</sup>

Another factor that encouraged the growth of militancy was the fact that from 1999 to 2008 Pakistan was governed by a military regime and run as a military dictatorship notwithstanding the quasi electoral façade that Gen. Musharraf painted over this design.

The MMA was brought to power in the KP, through massive voting manipulation by the intelligence services in the 2002 general elections. Members were nominated to seats by officers of intelligence services. On the surface, Pakistan was an ally of the US but in reality its leadership was playing a dual game where it had a secret deal with the rightist parties that ultimately handed over the KP province to those who were bent on fragmenting it. Musharraf and his team thus had a hand in the creation of the misery of the citizens of Swat. The leadership of a State that plays with the lives of its citizens and even sacrifices its own soldiers must be led by cynicism, expediency and opportunism.<sup>35</sup>

During research work for this paper secondary confirmation about Pakistani short sighted policies become evident when the then Governor KP held a Jirga with the Mohmand tribe on 25<sup>th</sup> Oct 2001, and stated that the government will not stop those who wished to go to Afghanistan to assist their brethren.<sup>36</sup> The message reached Sufi Mohammad in Dir and he began to raise a lashkar in Maidan for Jihad in Afghanistan. It was joined by people from other Malakand districts. Between 27<sup>th</sup> Oct and the movement of the lashkar from Bajaur into Afghanistan via Kunar in early Nov 2001, senior officers then in charge of FATA, repeatedly advised the Governor KP to issue a warning to Sufi Mohammad to disperse the lashkar and not to cross the international boundary. Unfortunately this advice was dismissed and a lashkar of about 9000 Jihadis was allowed to slip into Afghanistan to fight in support

of the Talibans.<sup>37</sup> We know what happened afterwards. People were killed in their hundreds and the lashkar dispersed.

Sufi Mohammad instead of returning to Dir where he would have been surely killed for causing so much distress presented himself for arrest in Kurram Agency on 16<sup>th</sup> Nov 2001. He begged the arresting authority not to send him to Dir where he was sure that the families of the dead would have asked him to account for their lost ones. Sufi Mohammad was done a favor by the administration of Kurram when he was imprisoned in D.I Khan Jail instead of a jail in Swat or Dir! During his trial in D.I Khan Jail he begged the presiding officer and the Jirga to convict him so as to save his life and reputation.<sup>38</sup> This help was also given to the Machiavelli of Malakand!

## **D. Household perceptions on security**

The survey results paint a sorry picture of security from the perception of the people. Counter insurgency theory is agreed that no COIN effort can succeed, unless security is provided to the population. Let us examine some of the key results in this connection.

- 77% of the households clearly said that security for the people was poor (Annex-1, Fig 50).
- 92% of the households said that they were afraid of the militants (Annex-1, Fig 51). In other words the population did not expect any tangible assistance from police. Clearly the households were happy when the military was deployed and 78% of the households felt happy with the presence of the military (Annex-1, Fig 58). Given the convergence of institutional trends mentioned in connection with the military and the need for security it is clear that the military will not be withdrawn from KP for at least the next few years.

However the presence of the military has negative implications for the secular forces in KP and on the economic growth in KP. It has been noted that once the military moves into a region it disturbs the value chain that leads to the creation of livelihoods. It takes families generations to create livelihoods; they achieve this by entering the value chain of an agricultural economy that is related to crop production, trading, transport or services. Most of a rural family's savings and surplus is in the shape of livestock or fruit and commercial trees like poplars. When a military operation in such a region starts the first unintended consequence is the destruction of the value chain that was built over generations. Trees,

crops and livestock are destroyed and a majority of the population has to flee the region as IDPs. This breaks the value chain disrupts trade and business relationships and bankrupts everyone who is affected.

The savings disappear overnight – the majority becomes impecunious itinerants drifting from place to place living a life in destitution. It increases the number of the marginalized who are willing to join the next group of militants if they are provided a good offer! In the case of Swat the loss to livelihoods alone is estimated conservatively to be more than Rs. 40 billion. The government placates the population and intellectuals by dream statements as if streams of milk and honey would soon be provided to the destitute through re-construction and re-building – some even speak of having a Marshal Plan as was provided to Germany and Japan for their re-construction. How impractical and fruitless.

In Europe and Japan the Second World War destroyed the industrial and infrastructure assets. However, these nations retained the primary ingredient for the rebirth of an economy – their educated and skilled manpower as well as their experience of building institutions. The Marshal Plan succeeded because of the trained manpower and institutions and not because money was made available.

One message that comes out quite clearly is – don't deploy the military unless that is the last option because even if you succeed in breaking the back of the militants belonging to the class of 2010, ask what good that will that be for the class of 2011 or others who come afterwards, unless we are prepared to take steps to address the drivers of conflict on a long term basis. On top of the list is improvement in governance.

Another important finding from areas that have remained for some period under the militants is that their presence did not have a negative impact on long term economic growth; life went on normally for the majority of the people. Families went on making a living except the elites who suffered a downturn in their fortunes. Is there a lesson here? Probably not, as this requires more research – it may be the case at the cusp of the trend; but the question is how will the long term trend shape out?

The lessons are very clear. Military operations must be short where the possible unintended consequences are weighted. Secondly, the operation must have a clear exit strategy based on hold and build elements that are budgeted before an operation begins. Otherwise we will



continue to remain in constant warfare. Unfortunately most of the elements of future planning for the re-building of Swat are absent. If this be the case then will the district not relapse into warfare of the militants again?

- 68% of the households felt that the military had neutralized the militants (Annex-1, Fig 59). However, if one believes that there is still a nexus between security and the Jihadist core it is possible that the situation might again deteriorate once again.
- The signs of the likely scenario in the future are discernable. As the militants have not been routed they have reorganized and have begun to execute pro government elders and members of government lashkars. In short what has happened is that the position as it prevailed in 2003- 04 has begun to re-emerge.
- The question is what is to be done? It is clear that unless there is a transformation of attitudes, expecting that reforming the police or the civil armed forces will help is incorrect. A better option will be to assist communities to guard themselves. This advice is based on the assumption that since the Pashtun are all armed they can best guard their communities though with the support of elite units when communities are attacked by better armed militants. This is a different approach to security than the one in vogue.
- Simultaneously security will enhance if the number of marginalized people whether due to poverty, or other reasons is reduced by other policy measures. Unfortunately the elitist forces have foreclosed land reforms.

## E. Weakness in policies

One of the weaknesses of policies in the current counter terrorism effort in Swat is that the government policy did not contain an articulated *end state* that will emerge after the military operation is over. In reply to a question, 89% of the households in Swat feared that there is every likelihood of bloodshed in Swat due to the Pakhtun proclivity to seek vengeance for any perceived wrong; during the last six years Swat has been full of events that will be explored by many families in the context of revenge once the military leaves the valley (Annex 1, Fig 66).

Secondly there is now general agreement that unless policies are implemented in each of the three separate stages of a counter terrorism operation to re-establish the writ of the state, the area will revert to its disturbed earlier stage. These three stages are:

- Clear
- Hold

- Build

Unfortunately after the first stage of the clearing operation launched by the military in Swat that began with Operation Rah-E-Rast (Right Path), the other components of the holding and re-building of the area cleared from militants and terrorists is slow in coming and has been out of sync with military operation, despite adequate time for creating plans to cover these aspects. It is now nine years since the country has been fighting the insurgents, yet clarity on the next steps to be implemented in areas that have been cleared, is yet to be articulated.

One obvious reason for this shortcoming is an absence of the high level of coordination that is needed in the area of security and provision of services to the population to re-establish the link between the state and communities. As long as this deficit in the provision of policies related to the holding of territory and protecting the population exists, re-establishing a functional state in Swat is difficult.

The findings from this research indicate a multitude of areas that require priority attention in the *hold* and *build* category, if Swat and other areas undergoing similar problem of militancy and terrorism are to be retrieved successfully.

## **F. Local government reforms**

Clearly when the threat of war loomed over Pakistan after 9/11 it was perhaps the worst of the times to usher in risky reforms that attempted to re-organize security. The highlights below analyses the Local Government Reforms:

- There are grounds to believe that Gen Musharraf did not undertake this reform for altruistic reasons. He wanted to do two things that every military dictator in Pakistan has desired but has invariably failed to achieve; to govern Pakistan as a unitary state by-passing the provinces. Secondly to obtain legitimacy from newly created structure. Ayub Khan created the Basic Democracies much like what Gen Musharraf desired. Local government reform is also an attempt to bribe the lesser elites who are invariably 2nd class district level politicians created to prolong the period of a military dictatorship.
- The British Imperialists had a tested method for delivery of services and maintenance of law and order that was the district administration. If Gen Musharraf had only shifted development powers to local government then the reforms could have been progressive. However, what he did was something much more sinister and

destructive. At the start of the Jihadist war, Pakistan ought to have consolidated its steel grid-lock of district administration making it into a formidable bulwark. Yet despite the obvious dangers he broke the grid-lock by abolishing the civilian security administrative structure at the start of a war!

- It caused the following problems:
  - The joint police – magistracy system which oversaw crime and law and order was destroyed. The police was modeled on the Japanese pattern! In doing so Musharraf showed that he did not care about the historical and cultural drives that influenced administrative structures. Under this reform the power over police was transferred to the feudal land lords who marginalized the peasantry further, some even reduced the share of irrigation water to the marginalized farmers!
  - The district Nazims being local were easily influenced by pressures, many of them of a criminal nature generated by Mafias. In Swat in some cases the Nizams became supporters of the militants willingly.
  - The district Nazims were afraid to take coercive action against criminals and offenders as they belonged to the same community and were afraid to prosecute.
  - In other cases the Nazims represented the landlords and became target of the militants. Many abandoned their posts; some were killed including the district Nazim. These occurrences clearly showed how shallow were Musharraf's reforms.
  - It may be noted that at this time Swat was under the MMA government composed of religious parties who were anti-landlord and as such against most of the Nazims. The destabilization ushered by Gen Musharraf assisted them in giving a free hand to the militants.
- Secondly since the MMA was sympathetic towards the militant's cause in Swat and elsewhere they colluded making the whole administrative framework weak. Had there been the previous system of district administration the effectiveness of measures against militants would have been better and could have provided effective protection to the communities.

The following are some of the key findings from the survey relating to the impact of the local government reforms upon militancy and security:

- 56% of households thought that the reform of local bodies led to destabilization of administrative structures and provided space to the militants (Annex-1, Fig 18).
- 82% respondents said that the Provincial Government did not tackle militancy effectively (Annex-1, Fig 23).
- A large percentage of 75% were of the view that government effectiveness declined after the Local Government Reforms (Annex-1, Fig 25).
- Similarly 78% of respondents said that after the reforms of 2001 government coordination at district level became worse (Annex-1 Fig 26).
- Similarly 75% of respondents said that after the reforms of 2001 the quality of governance declined (Annex-1 Fig 27).
- 67% of the respondents thought that had the previous structure of administration led by deputy commissioners been in place militancy could have been prevented! (Annex-1, Fig 28).
- In another set of answers, 82% of respondents felt that the Nazims failed to prevent militancy (Annex-1, Fig 29).
- Had the system addressed peoples grievances the followers of militants would have been reduced. 78% agreed with this view (Annex-1, Fig 32). Since the local government system was ineffective and lacked coordination grievances increased and remained unaddressed.
- To another question, 70% of responding households thought that the government was complacent in not preventing the flow of heavy weapons to Swat (Annex-1, Fig 36).
- In another negative result, 67% of households thought that administrations contacts with militants encouraged them (Annex-1, Fig 37). This referred to the questionable conduct of senior administrators who were on friendly terms with militants. In one case it was the actions of a senior administrator who was sympathetic to the militant's cause who arranged for them to enter Buner in 2009!
- It is quite clear from the results relating to the Local Government Reform 2001 that it was damaging to the interest of the state and was considered beneficial to the militants. It is indeed strange to note that a military dictator

took an extremely high risk road to reform through the Local Government Ordinance 2001 and opened the gates to the militants at the start of a global war.

- It is curious to note that the federal government's recent tentative steps to bring reforms to FATA by amending the Political Parties Act and the Frontier Crimes Regulation have been delayed due to pressure by the military. This is counterproductive to Pakistan's stability.

## G. Special areas of Pakistan

Malakand contains almost 25% of the KP population and has 24 legislators in the assembly and they can pass legislative measures for the whole of the province but they cannot pass any legislation for Malakand! Only the President is authorized to approve the passage of legislation in the form of a regulation for Swat. This is an anomaly with serious implications. Thus even after 40 years after the merger of Swat into KP it is still "Viceroy's territory" and continues to be a special area. The full writ of the superior courts does not prevail and fundamental rights are not available. In other words the region is kept as a *marginalized* part of Pakistan.

As discussed in an earlier part of this paper marginalization could be caused by a number of factors some of the important ones are based on poverty, ethnicity, tribalism, geography or regulations.

Pakistan has four kinds of regulatory spaces provided under the constitution (see map):

- FATA where the seven tribal regions are located.
- The provincially administered tribal areas of KP that includes the whole of Malakand division including Swat.
- Azad Kashmir that is a special territory whose status will be resolved once the Kashmir issue with India is resolved and
- The normal districts to which all constitutional rights, freedoms and laws apply.

Let us examine the provisions of some of the Constitutional provisions relating to the special areas. Under Article 246 (b) Swat is a provincially administered tribal area. Under Art 247 (2)

the President can give directions to the Governor KP for purposes of administration of Swat. Similarly under Art 247 (3) the provincial assembly cannot legislate for Swat unless the President approves a legislation to be implemented there. As the map shows it is FATA and PATA that have become centers of insurgency. There are a few explanations for this.

Firstly, when an area is placed under the provision of Art 247 the normal jurisdiction of the courts is ousted, so the right of recourse to High Court and Supreme Court is lost. Secondly, the constitutional provisions related to freedoms and rights are not available.

Thirdly, all the laws are not applicable. For instance, in FATA the political parties cannot operate. If these exceptions did not lead to indemnities it may have been tolerable. But exclusion from jurisdiction of the Constitution for provisions dealing with freedoms and rights create marginalization of people and regions. In areas which are cut off by regulation from the mainstream, the rights of the people suffer and it also allows a manipulative government to exploit the people of such areas for foreign policy objectives.

Researchers have found that one reason for militancy and terrorism is disconnectedness. If you are disconnected you are isolated, deprived, repressed, uneducated and under developed.<sup>39</sup> All these deficits define marginalization. The elite who benefit from such disconnectedness ensure that the status quo is maintained. They do not realize what this disconnectedness does to the people who live there. Evidently PATA with a past history of links with Jihadist should have forced Pakistan to mainstream it immediately. The table below compares the development indicators of FATA that like Swat is a *marginalized* region.

The deficit between the indicators of different areas is self evident. This is the result of Article 247. It has the same negative impact wherever it is employed. It negates growth and impoverishes those who live in such regions. This article is discriminatory as it is imposed on Pakhtun lands.

#### **Selected human development indicators for Pakistan, KP and FATA (2003)**

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Pakistan</b>	<b>KP</b>	<b>FATA</b>
Literacy (both sexes %)	43.92	35.41	17.42

Male literacy (%)	54.81	51.39	29.51
Female literacy (%)	32.02	18.82	3.00
Population per doctor	1,226	4,916	7,670
Population per bed in health institutions	1,341	1,594	2,179
Road (per sq km)	0.26	0.13	0.17
* Literacy rates according to 1998 census; all other figures for 2003.			

Unfortunately the executive lost many opportunities when the occasion arose to make a change. For instance on 12 Feb 1994, the Supreme Court of Pakistan set aside the legal structure that had been improvised for Swat and ordered that special laws were against the fundamental rights and that Malakand be governed under normal Pakistani laws. This was a land mark decision and had it been implemented in 1994, it is reckoned that there would not have been an insurgency in Swat today.

However, this was not done. It was an open invitation to the Jihadist and others to make their own demands. These were not long in coming. Sufi Mohammad launched his demand for implementation of Shariah on May 9, 1994 at a gathering in Dir. Due to the pressure from interest groups the PATA regulations continue to regulate Swat despite presence of the military.

During this research every effort was made to find evidence where either the provincial or federal government had taken steps to implement the Supreme Court decision. It is sad to reflect that not even a Cabinet meeting was held to discuss the court decision. A decision of such a magnitude was thus totally ignored.

While we are blind to the evils of marginalization, the strategic value of disconnectedness was well known to the master of Jihadi, Sheikh Azaam, bin Laden's mentor and teacher. In his famous fatwa on Jihad, he underlines the need for Jihadist forces to remain in contact and have influence in FATA for strategic reasons! If special areas are beneficial to Jihadists

then isn't the converse true for the Pakistani government that it must get rid of special areas?

As noted above it is quite ironic to note that the present government wanted to extend the Political Parties Act to FATA and to reform the Frontier Crimes Regulation. Both reforms are shelved! Although, they didn't concern Swat yet if these reforms had occurred, the next move would surely have been the exclusion of Malakand from the purview of Article 247. It is a risk free reform unless we want Jihadism to remain anchored within this region for the foreseeable future. If that be the case, then unfortunately this region will continue to burn in Jihadist fire. Its people will remain marginalized and they would suffer immensely.



# CHAPTER 8

## A MODEL OF THE CRISIS

### A. Introduction

The result of the Swat survey and this analysis has brought out quite clearly what the problems and issues stoking the fire of violence against the state in Swat are? However, no analysis is complete unless it reconstructs the sequence of the disaster. In this section we discuss the role of marginalization in creating the conditions of insurgency. In the next section an attempt is made to reconstruct the Swat tragedy as found by this research.

### B. Marginalization

- It is clear that the link between the state and the community is strong when the latter is seen as a benefactor and it delivers services that are valued by individuals. These services relate to programs in the field of education, health and other basic needs sectors. This issue has been discussed earlier when we examined the role played of *exclusion* and *marginalization* of individuals and communities in driving the Swat insurgency. Clearly, military operations by themselves are not a solution and will fail as they create further *marginalization as explained before*. If KP wants to avoid such a fate then efforts must be made to provide solutions that remove marginalization of people in any form.
- The challenge by the *marginalized* who have combined with the terrorists is to challenge the State's ability to govern; another way of describing it is that over a period of time the government has become dysfunctional and is prevented from supplying those goods that lead to the creation of legitimacy by associating a larger population with itself in what one will call enterprise Pakistan. Association by choice permits the state to govern through voluntary obedience. According to this analysis, legitimacy occurs when the state provides the following social goods at an efficient level;
  - Security

- Justice
  - Political empowerment
  - Livelihood and employment
- An axiom that we should not forget is that *vulnerable* individuals and communities will fight the state if they blame it for their failure to function as an economic and a social unit.
  - If force is used against them under conditions where *marginalization* and *vulnerability* exist, one can be certain that such marginalized groups will challenge the state; if they are encouraged by indigenous or international *radical groups*, then the reaction will be more severe and unrest more long lasting. Under such conditions the use of coercive force actually encourages insurgency to spread.
  - Therefore let us be less sanguinary about the positive long term impact of the current military operations in Swat. As a matter of fact operations increase the effectiveness of militant groups as they are forced to become better rural and urban guerillas for survival. Continuous use of force ensures the loss of the war! This calculus is what makes the WoT a failure.<sup>40</sup>

### C. A reconstruction of the Swat militancy

One of the most important factors that prevented Pakistan from proceeding with the complete merger of Malakand division of which Swat is part was the manipulation of circumstances by various important players for protecting their own self interest. The objectives of the vested interests to retain their privileged status coincided with a strategic game changer that occurred with the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979.

In the process Swat was radicalized. Some highlights of this event are narrated below. While the state was being weakened by the presence of well armed militias, a new opportunity was provided to the militants to put forward their claims for the imposition of Shariah system of law when the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Feb in 1994 challenged the administrative regulations under Article 247 of the Constitution as violative of it. Executive authority of the province that was already marginal made the state dysfunctional. It was an

excellent moment for the province to mainstream the region into Pakistan rather than keep it as a special area.

However, the vested interests including the political executive ignored the decision. This gap in regulation was noted by the militants and was filled first by Maulana Sufi Mohammad and latter by more radical militants who became stronger after the US intervention in Afghanistan and the flow of militants to Swat from Bajaur and other parts.

The militancy that we witness today is the result of a complicated interplay of several forces at work. The synopsis below explains a complex dynamics of the interaction of forces that operated to create terrorism in Swat in 2004-09 and is as follows:

- After the merger of Swat, Dir & Chitral states in 1969 vide regulation no 1 of 1969, these areas were allowed to be governed by custom and usages having the force of law till 1974. In April 1974, regular courts were established and some laws were extended to that area.
- In 1975 two Regulations for administering criminal and civil disputes were promulgated and the judicial powers were vested in the bureaucracy, local Jirgas and religious scholars of Swat. They used their power to suppress and subjugate the ordinary citizens of the area through subverting the judicial process. The poor were marginalized further by this regulation.
- By 1980s the Jamat e Islami a religious national level Pakistani party had built influence in upper Dir and Buner districts. Swat, Malakand protected areas and Chitral remained outside the influence of JI. A tussle ensued between it and the PPP a secular party to dominate.
- The workers of JI were recruited in the Afghan Refugee Commissionerate, who were benefited with handsome salaries and were used for influencing Pashtun society for Afghan Jihad.
- In Malakand division ex senator Sher Mohammad Khan of Shangla, Dr. Mehboob ur Rehman and Dost Mohammad Khan were influential leaders of PPP who were later on joined by the son of ex Wali of Swat namely Mian Gul Amir Zaib and Amane Room who were elected to National Assemblies in 1977 and 1988.
- Aftab Khan Sherpao who became the Chief Minister of KP in 1988 wanted to win over the Malakand districts of Dir/Swat for his party because of their electoral strength.

- The business interests and elites of Swat who were involved in the running of specialized silk textile units or cosmetic industry wanted the special status of Malakand to continue as they received exemption from custom duties and taxation under such a dispensation.
- The administrators in the region wanted the special status to continue as it gave them formidable discretionary power and any movement towards mainstreaming would reduce their power
- Thus the interests of Aftab Sherpao the Chief Minister, the administrators and the business community coalesced to retain the special status of Malakand by sponsoring Sufi Muhammad, an ex worker of JI who had broken away from the movement upon a disagreement. He believed that in Islam there was no concept of democracy; only knowledgeable and honest theologians should run an Islamic state based on Shariah. Consequently, he created the TNSM to contest the JI. This suited the PPP administration and they used Sufi Mohammad to make inroads into the JI vote bank. The PPP avoided the use of violence in the initial stages of the rise of TNSM.
- When the US intervened in Afghanistan in Dec 2001, Sufi Mohammad announced Jihad against the US and led many hundreds of TNSM supporters in a lashkar to support the Afghan Taliban. Several hundred residents of Malakand division died in Afghanistan as a result. One of the side effects of this episode was a further radicalization of Malakand division and KP. Sufi Mohammad was arrested upon his return from Afghanistan and placed in D.I Khan jail.
- General Musharraf not only patronized, trained and financed the local militants but also gave safe passage to those who came from Afghanistan after the military intervention by US. The militants came to South and North Waziristan and some later shifted to Bajaur. These militants consisted of Afghans, Arabs, Chechens, Uzbek, Tajik and Punjabis.
- In the 2002 elections Gen. Musharraf sponsored the victory of the MMA in KP who became his secret supporters. The MMA also looked the other way when Mullah Fazlullah, a son in law of Sufi Mohammad created his own faction of militants in Swat.
- Since the JI was also a member of the religious ruling coalition in KP from 2002-07, they continued to detain Sufi Mohammad because of his earlier challenge of the JI.
- From 2002 to 2007 the religious radicals grew in strength in the region with the tacit support of the MMA and the manipulation of Gen. Musharraf who wanted to keep the

threat of Islamic radicalization alive to draw resources and support from the US for his undemocratic and personal rule. This complex dynamic spread the radical revolt against Pakistan to other districts like Dir and elsewhere as well as tribal area of Waziristan, Bajaur, Mohmand etc

- The ANP Govt. that came to power as a result of the 2008 elections defeating the MMA won all the 7 provincial seats from Swat. It wanted to defuse the flames of revolt and went into a peace deal with the militants in Feb 2009 after having earlier released Sufi Mohammad from jail. A move that was also supported by the strong Pakistani intelligence agencies. A deal was struck by the ANP Govt. which first signed a peace agreement with Fazlullah group on 21st May, 2008 and which lasted for about two months.
- A second deal was signed in July 2008 with Sufi Mohammad after the Govt. agreed to accede to his demand for the promulgation of his version of Shariah and in return the militants will become peaceable.
- However, after the de facto transfer of power to the militants in April 2009 in Swat, the militants did not give up their rebellion and took over Buner a neighboring district. Secondly, the militants refused to hand over their heavy weapons or remove their check posts as agreed with the government of KP.
- Sufi Mohammad became more belligerent and even began to abuse the Pakistani apex institutions like the Parliament and the higher courts. In Swat terrorist activities against the state and the citizens increased. It clearly showed that the militants were no longer under the control of Sufi Mohammad or he and they had other designs.
- Pakistani civil society that had remained aloof from this struggle in FATA and KP finally woke up to the dangers of a possible future under the tyrannical militants when videos of their barbarity against women and abuse of the Pakistan state institutions were witnessed by them. This provided the rationale for the Pakistan government to move the military into the region to stamp out the rebellion. This move for now has the support of the public.
- It is premature to say whether the current military operation will succeed in its various objectives. One thing is however certain that the dynamics of past decisions has created new forces that will take considerable effort to neutralize. What began as a struggle for small gains has shaped itself as a serious threat to Pakistani and international security.

## Conclusion

Before concluding the analysis of the results emerging out of survey regarding the “Main Causes of the Breakdown of Governance and Rise of Militancy” it is necessary to respond with findings regarding the research hypotheses listed on pages 4-5 of this report.

- The result of the survey shows that when the government fails to provide services to its people it weakens the bonds between the state and the communities and creates grievances
- The survey found that those who are *marginalized* because of lack of access to income joined the militants
- Income marginalization also swelled the ranks of militants. Those without land helped the militants and forcibly took possession of land from the feudal.
- Poor governance, weak dispensation of justice and lack of reform to mainstream Swat into KP helped militancy
- The introduction of the Local Bodies Reform 2001 and the manipulation of the administrative structure of the country assisted militancy and was a reckless experiment conducted by Gen Musharraf
- The survey established a close connection between religious based education and militancy. Swat region has been a bastion of Jihadism and people support it if credible leadership is present.
- The weak PATA Regulation under which Swat was administered since its merger in 1969 was a factor encouraging the rise of militancy in Swat. The vested interest prevented the mainstreaming of Swat.
- Weak regulation of illegal broadcasting encouraged the growth of militancy
- The provincial government was sympathetic to the Swat militants from 2002-07 and state stewardship of the State was compromised.

The study has highlighted the dynamics of the failure of governance and the rise of militancy in Swat. Although there are suggestions for improving the situation and are indicated in the report. However, the biggest problem facing Pakistan in battling the insurgent is the weak and fragmented civil military leadership. They do not share the same world view and there is a need to get more cohesion amongst them to establish control and security in Swat.

The arguments presented in the report also confirm the larger hypothesis that those who joined the cause of the militants did so to improve their lives. It can be concluded with certainty that most of those who fought the state, excluding the non-Swatis did so to defeat marginality and the fighting was an effort by the poor to reintegrate into the community on their terms. The report concludes on the note that Swat faces complex challenges where the efforts of the marginalized operate within the complex dynamics of a historical mind set anchored in a Jihadist framework that is begin pulled by the rhetoric of the War on Terror on the one hand and a questionable liberating theology of bin Laden who accuses the government of Pakistan of scarifying the interest of its people for the sake of pleasing the US. Disentangling this knot will be a Herculean task for Pakistan.

# Notes

## Chapter – 1

<sup>1</sup> Report. Ismail Khan, “Desperate moves on to secure Swat – the lost valley,” The Dawn International, Jan 15, 2009, accessed from <http://www.dawn.com/2009/01/15/top1.htm>

<sup>2</sup> Dawn, Report. “Taliban take over Afghan district,” P. 14, May 30<sup>th</sup> 2010, said that a group of Taliban band composed of militants from Swat attacked police stations in Nuristan. They were reportedly led by Fazalullah who ran Swat before his escape from the Pakistan military in Swat

<sup>3</sup> “PAKISTAN SECURITY REPORT 2009.” Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, P. 1

<sup>4</sup> David Kilcullen, “The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting small Wars in the Midst of a Big One,” Oxford, 2009.

## Chapter 2

<sup>5</sup> Ibid (2)

## Chapter 3

<sup>6</sup> Sultan-I-Rome, “Swat State (1915-1969): From Genesis to Merger,” Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2008, P. 105

<sup>7</sup> Sultan-I-Rome, “Administrative system of the princely state of Swat,” Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, Lahore, Vol. XXXXIII, Dec 2006

<sup>8</sup> Shamshad Ahmad, “Crisis of State and Government in Pakistan,” Criterion, Jan-March 2010, Vol 5, No 1, Rawalpindi, P. 46

## Chapter 4

<sup>9</sup> Khalid Aziz, “Criminalizing the women in Swat,” accessed from [www.riport.org](http://www.riport.org) <http://riport.org/search.php?id=21>

<sup>10</sup> Center for Research & Security Studies, “SWAT – Litmus Test for Government’s Writ,” 2009, accessed from <http://www.crss.pk/wpager09/we26jan09.pdf>

<sup>11</sup> Azam & Aftab, “Inequality and the Militant Threat,” in Pakistan Conflict & Peace Studies, Vol 2, No 2, April-June 2009, P. 40

## Chapter - 5

<sup>12</sup> Ibid (17) P. 41

<sup>13</sup> Govt of North West Frontier Province, “NWFP: A District-based Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey, 2001,” Planning & Development Department, Peshawar (2002)

<sup>14</sup> Interview of Dr. Ferhia Peracha, Cognitive Psychologist, Sabaoon Project, Malakand.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid (20), P.53.

<sup>16</sup> These figures have been taken from the KP provinces’ presentation to the 7th National Finance Commission meeting held in 2009.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid (17) P. 37

## Chapter - 6

<sup>18</sup> Sultan e Rome, “Mughals and Swat,” [http://www.valleyswat.net/literature/papers/MUGHULS\\_AND\\_SWAT.pdf](http://www.valleyswat.net/literature/papers/MUGHULS_AND_SWAT.pdf), accessed on 10<sup>th</sup> April 2010. Is an interesting ethno-historical monograph elaborating the early history of the Yusufzais in Swat and their interaction with the Mughals

<sup>19</sup> Daud Khan Khattak, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Swat Valley,” New America Foundation, Washington, P.5

<sup>20</sup> Ibid (8) See pages 229-237

<sup>21</sup> Regional Institute of Policy Research & Training. “NWFP Millennium Development Goals Report – 2005,” Peshawar, P. 2

<sup>22</sup> Social Development Policy Centre. “Social Development in Pakistan 2004: Combating Poverty: Is Growth Sufficient?” available at <http://www.spdc.org.pk/pubs/pubdisp.asp?id=anr6>.

## Chapter - 7

<sup>23</sup> Ibid (3) P. 81

<sup>24</sup> Ibid (3) P. 46.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid (3) P. 215

<sup>26</sup> Ibid (25), P. 279



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- <sup>27</sup> Report. The Dawn, "MPA wants end to birth control to spur 'Jihad'" June 29<sup>th</sup> 2010, P.13
- <sup>28</sup> "MULLAH AS INSURGENT: SOCIAL MOBILITY THROUGH GOD," US and USMC Counterinsurgency Blog accessed on 20<sup>th</sup> June, <http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/coin/archive/2010/02/10/mullah-as-insurgent-social-mobility-through-god.aspx>
- <sup>29</sup> Editorial. The Friday Times, June 25 – July 1 2010, Lahore, P.1
- <sup>30</sup> Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948", Oxford, Karachi 2007, Pp.179, 197-198, 256
- <sup>31</sup> Hassan Abbas, "Inside Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province: The Political Landscape of the Insurgency," New America Foundation, Washington, April 2010, P. 6
- <sup>32</sup> Khalid Ahmed, "Pakistan and Nature of the State: Revisionism, Jihad and Governance," Criterion Quarterly April / June 2010, Islamabad, P. 154
- <sup>33</sup> Charles Allen, "God's Terrorists," Abacus, London, 2006, P. 262
- <sup>34</sup> Daud Khan Khattak, "The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in the Swat Valley," New American Foundation, Washington, 2010, P. 13
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid (29)
- <sup>36</sup> Daily Mashriq, "Governor Addresses Mohmand Jirga," Oct 26<sup>th</sup> 2001, Peshawar.
- <sup>37</sup> Name of source protected. This information was provided to the author by the officer who advised the Governor and handled this matter
- <sup>38</sup> Name of the source withheld. This was narrated to the author by the political officer conducting Sufi Mohammad's trial in D.I Khan Jail
- <sup>39</sup> Thomas P.M Barnett, "The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century," G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 2004, P.49
- <sup>40</sup> The Dawn, Khalid Aziz, "The calculus of war," May 10<sup>th</sup> 2010, P.5, also posted at "[http://www.khalidaziz.com/art\\_detail.php?aid=331](http://www.khalidaziz.com/art_detail.php?aid=331)"



Figure - 1




Figure – 2




Figure – 3






Figure – 4



**Figure – 5**



**Figure – 6**




Figure – 7




Figure – 8




Figure – 9




Figure – 10




Figure – 11




Figure – 12






Figure – 13




Figure – 14




Figure – 15




Figure – 16




Figure – 17




Figure – 18




Figure – 19




Figure – 20




Figure – 21




Figure – 22




Figure – 23




Figure – 24




Figure – 25




Figure – 26




Figure – 27




Figure – 28






Figure – 29




Figure – 30




Figure – 31




Figure – 32




Figure – 33




Figure – 34




Figure – 35




Figure – 36




Figure – 37




Figure – 38




Figure – 39




Figure – 40




Figure – 41




Figure – 42




Figure – 43




Figure – 44






Figure – 45




Figure – 46




Figure – 47




Figure – 48




Figure – 49




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


Figure – 51




Figure – 52




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


Figure – 54




Figure – 55




Figure – 56




Figure – 57




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


Figure – 59




Figure – 60






Figure – 61




Figure – 62




Figure – 63




Figure – 64




Figure – 65




Figure – 66

